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ABSTRACT 
Part of Something Larger Than Ourselves: 
George H.W. Bush and the Rhetoric of the First  
U.S. War in the Persian Gulf.  (August 2007) 
Nicolas Rangel, Jr., B.A., California State University Long Beach; 
M.A., California State University Long Beach 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Leroy G. Dorsey 
 
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, George H.W. Bush achieved 
the rhetorical success that had escaped his prior speaking endeavors.  If the 
aforementioned assessments regarded Bush’s Gulf War rhetoric as a rhetorical triumph, 
in light of prior damning criticism of his rhetorical abilities, then an explanation for that 
triumph is in order.  Bush’s rhetoric differed from his Presidential predecessors by virtue 
of two factors.  First, as the first U.S. president of the Post-Cold War era, Bush’s rhetoric 
faced different rhetorical constraints than those faced by his predecessors, as he no 
longer had the narrative framework of the Cold War to explain U.S. foreign policy 
action. Second, Bush rhetorically juxtaposed American exceptionalism and realism 
within his rhetoric itself.  This differed from the rhetoric of his immediate predecessor, 
Ronald Reagan, whose rhetoric employed American exceptionalism without reference to 
realism, although that rhetoric was strategically geared toward achieving realist foreign 
policy ends.  Bush’s success was also considerable in that he faced significant rhetorical 
constraints created or exacerbated by Reagan.  Reagan’s reputation as the “Great 
    
iv 
Communicator,” contrasted with Bush’s less-than-stellar reputation as an orator, makes 
Bush’s rhetorical success particularly worth understanding. 
President George H.W. Bush relied on three particular arguments to facilitate a 
U.S. military victory during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  These arguments differed 
considerably from foreign policy arguments offered by the Reagan administration with 
respect to the manner in which they addressed issues concerning the United Nations and 
the Vietnam War.  First, Bush promoted U.N. diplomacy as a subsidiary of U.S. foreign 
policy.  For Bush, the U.N. served as a venue where world opinion could be galvanized 
and action serving United States interests would not be constrained so much as 
legitimized.  Second, he compared and contrasted U.S. action in the Gulf to the Vietnam 
War.  In doing so, he combined the moral urgency of prior foreign policy efforts with the 
hindsight necessary to avoid a repeat of the American experience in Vietnam.  Third, in 
retrospectively assessing the Gulf War, Bush depicted the conflict as a discrete foreign 
policy event in which he narrowly defined victory.  Bush defined victory as the removal 
of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, in an attempt to shape a historical consensus on the 
significance of U.S. action.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
PRESIDENT GEORGE H.W. BUSH AND THE RHETORICAL SITUATION  
 
DURING THE FIRST GULF WAR 
 
Saddam Hussein has given us a whole plateful of clarity, because today, in the 
Persian Gulf, what we are looking at is good and evil, right and wrong. 
 
President George Herbert Walker Bush 
“Remarks to Officers and Troops at Hickam Air Force Base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii” 
October 28, 1990 
 
Political scientists and rhetorical critics hailed President George H.W. Bush’s 
success in rallying public support for military action during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  
They considered it one of the most significant achievements of his administration.  The 
immediate political implications of the conflict were substantial enough that by war’s 
end, Bush enjoyed public approval ratings exceeding the peak ratings of any U.S. 
president before him.1 
Scholars have cited the president’s rhetoric as a critical element in maintaining 
that support.  Political scientists Ryan J. Barilleaux and Mark J. Rozell, for example, 
argued that the president so astutely framed his arguments for war in the Gulf that the 
public understood and embraced his characterization of events and the stakes involved in 
U.S. action.2  Mary D. Anatoli, a professor of political science, compared Bush’s rhetoric 
to that of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, alleging that his successful reading of the public 
projected an image of strong leadership without raising unnecessary alarm.3  Rhetorical  
_____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Rhetoric and Public Affairs. 
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scholar Kathleen M. German stated that Bush’s rhetoric provided a successful 
justification for the conflict “by reviving memories of the past,” while simultaneously 
quelling critics.4 
These assessments stand in marked contrast to the frequent negative appraisal of 
the president’s rhetorical ability in other situations.  Kathleen Hall Jamieson, rhetorical 
scholar and dean of the Annenberg School of Communication at the University of 
Pennsylvania, noted that Bush was ineffective in his efforts to influence the electorate 
and incapable of engaging in extended public argument about policy.5  Lilyan Wilder, a 
professional speech consultant who worked with Bush in 1980 described him as “verbally 
excessive, lacking proper emphasis and, generally, projecting an if-you-want-it-come-
and-get-it attitude.”  Even after she worked with him and noted improvement, Wilder still 
described him as a “struggling orator.”6  Craig R. Smith, a rhetorical scholar and another 
former speech writer to Bush, argued that by the end of his 1992 re-election bid, political 
observers regarded Bush as a rhetorical failure.7  This description significantly contrasted 
with Smith’s characterization of Bush during the Gulf War, where he noted that the 
president’s speechwriters made him sound “Lincolnesque.”8 
Bush, the commander-in-chief of the United States during Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm, achieved the rhetorical success that had escaped his prior 
speaking endeavors.  If the aforementioned assessments regarded Bush’s Gulf War 
rhetoric as a rhetorical triumph, in light of prior damning criticism of his rhetorical 
abilities, then an explanation for that triumph is in order.  Bush’s rhetoric differed from 
his Presidential predecessors by virtue of two factors.  First, as the first U.S. president of 
the Post-Cold War era, Bush’s rhetoric faced different rhetorical constraints than those 
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faced by his predecessors, as he no longer had the narrative framework of the Cold War 
to explain U.S. foreign policy action. Second, Bush rhetorically juxtaposed American 
exceptionalism and realism within his rhetoric itself.  This differed from the rhetoric of 
his immediate predecessor, Ronald Reagan, whose rhetoric employed American 
exceptionalism without reference to realism, although that rhetoric was strategically 
geared toward achieving realist foreign policy ends.  Bush’s success was also 
considerable in that he faced significant rhetorical constraints created or exacerbated by 
Reagan.  Reagan’s reputation as the “Great Communicator,” contrasted with Bush’s less-
than-stellar reputation as an orator, makes Bush’s rhetorical success particularly worth 
understanding. 
In this dissertation, I argue that President George H.W. Bush relied on three 
particular arguments to facilitate a U.S. military victory during the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War.  These arguments differed considerably from foreign policy arguments offered by 
the Reagan administration with respect to the manner in which they addressed issues 
concerning the United Nations and the Vietnam War.  First, Bush promoted U.N. 
diplomacy as a subsidiary of U.S. foreign policy.  For Bush, the U.N. served as a venue 
where world opinion could be galvanized and action serving United States interests 
would not be constrained so much as legitimized.  Second, he compared and contrasted 
U.S. action in the Gulf to the Vietnam War.  In doing so, he combined the moral urgency 
of prior foreign policy efforts with the hindsight necessary to avoid a repeat of the 
American experience in Vietnam.  Third, in retrospectively assessing the Gulf War, Bush 
depicted the conflict as a discrete foreign policy event in which he narrowly defined 
victory.  Bush defined victory as the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, in an attempt 
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to shape a historical consensus on the significance of U.S. action.  In the section that 
follows, I will describe how and why Bush’s rhetoric differed from Reagan’s. 
Bush’s Rhetorical Predecessor 
By several accounts, Reagan was one of the most gifted rhetors to occupy the 
Oval Office.  Rhetorical scholars Kurt W. Ritter and David Henry called Reagan “an 
extraordinary platform speaker,” a skill he effectively adapted to televised political 
speeches.9  Former Reagan speechwriter Tony Dolan indicated that Reagan was “an 
excellent speechwriter because he was a very excellent thinker.”10  American studies 
scholar Paul D. Erickson said Reagan spoke to Americans “as a people more powerfully 
and persuasively than any president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”11 
Reagan’s rhetorical ability, in comparison to the negative appraisals of Bush’s 
own ability, was not lost on Bush.  Bush explicitly reminded his speechwriters that he 
was not Reagan.12  Bush’s perceived distinction between pragmatic action and rhetoric 
resulted in his desire to avoid what Barilleaux and Rozell referred to as “Reagan-style 
ideological crusades.”13 As speechwriter Dan McGroarty noted in a telephone interview, 
Bush’s principal rhetorical concern reflected a cautious approach that caused others to 
note “he was not rhetorically inclined,” while actually demonstrating “ a certain care in 
one’s words to say, ‘I am inclined to be careful about how I do that.’”14  Bush did not 
disdain Reagan’s foreign policy legacy, although he did acknowledge to others that 
Reagan’s rhetorical style was not one that he was capable of emulating.15 
Reagan, however, cast such a prominent shadow over Bush’s presidency that 
some political scientists and rhetorical scholars noted that Bush was constrained by his 
duty to follow Reagan’s legacy.16  Rhetorical scholar and political scientist Mary Stuckey 
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claimed that Bush embraced “a rhetoric that includes stylistic tones reminiscent of 
Ronald Reagan” while differing in his “stress on substantive issues.”17  In a memorandum 
dated January 13, 1991 from speechwriter Jennifer Grossman to speechwriter 
Mark Lange entitled “SOU Quotes,” Grossman prominently featured several Reagan 
quotes for potential inclusion in the State of the Union address.18  Although none of the 
featured quotes from Reagan appeared in the final State of the Union address, the speech 
did prominently touch on similar themes to those found in the memorandum. 
In spite of Bush’s admiration for his predecessor, Reagan’s foreign policy rhetoric 
was also noteworthy for the manner in which it contrasted with Bush’s rhetoric in the 
Gulf War.  Reagan, for example, often vocally opposed the United Nations and publicly 
questioned its utility, both directly and through the Ambassadorship of Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick.19  Bush’s Gulf War rhetoric, on the other hand, explicitly relied upon  
arguments that positively characterized international multilateralism, particularly through 
the United Nations. 
Bush and Reagan also had differing approaches to the memory of the Vietnam 
War, which continued to serve as a constraint on foreign policy rhetoric.  Rhetorical 
scholars Davis W. Houck and Amos Kiewe attributed Reagan’s success against Jimmy 
Carter in 1980 to Reagan’s rhetorical use of optimism.  Reagan’s rhetorical optimism 
subsequently restored American pride in a manner not seen since before Vietnam.20  This 
newfound rhetorical optimism, however, was challenged when terrorists attacked the 
Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon.  For the public, that attack recalled the inherent risk 
in American military deployment. 
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Reagan’s address to the nation on October 27, 1983, dealing with that bombing 
and the successful U.S. invasion of Grenada, may have restored such optimism.  As 
rhetorical scholar Kurt W. Ritter argued, “The impact of that incident on public opinion 
could be moderated by linking it with the Grenada invasion, which had been a success.”21  
American fears that U.S. involvement in Central America could become another Vietnam 
tempered that optimism, leading to the anti-communist strategy of indirect military action 
by proxy in the Reagan Doctrine.22  Bush was, in many ways, better able to address 
effectively what he described as the Vietnam syndrome by directly confronting it.  He did 
so by explicitly contrasting direct U.S. military action in the Gulf with the Vietnam War 
The public’s reaction to the Vietnam War, or more accurately, the negative 
perception of that reaction among political elites, provided one explanation for this 
rhetorical shift.  Researchers have long held that there existed a relationship between war 
casualties and war support, and much of this research focused on U.S. participation in 
Vietnam.  Political scientist John E. Mueller conducted some of the initial work in this 
area in his seminal Presidents, War, and Public Opinion, which studied the Vietnam and 
Korean Wars.  Mueller found Americans initially sensitive to small losses at the war’s 
beginning, while public support became more prone to decline only after military forces 
incurred major casualties.23 
Research published after the Bush presidency indicated that the public was 
particularly loath to support certain forms of action.  The public particularly opposed 
policies “meant to pursue a new gain or defend a new outcome.”24  Other researchers also 
demonstrated a more direct correlation between casualty rates and success in Senate 
campaigns, where voters have a demonstrated tendency to hold incumbents directly 
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responsible for the conduct of the war.25  Additionally, academic work has seemed to 
support the contention that because of the rallying effect of wars, “extremely short 
conflicts that never outlive the rally effect see no decline in popular support.”26  Political 
elites may have interpreted the influence of foreign policy action on their popularity as a 
function of casualty aversion, although one study by Major Charles K. Hyde of the 
U.S. Air Force seemed to indicate that the public might be less risk averse than other 
leaders.27 
Bush’s prioritization of mission “doability” over “strategic importance” in his 
foreign policy rhetoric also marked a shift away from the strength of emphasis American 
orators placed on their country’s exceptional nature.  American exceptionalism described 
the belief in the unique and innate greatness of the United States, qualities which have 
shaped a special destiny for that nation.  That belief had deep social and cultural roots in 
American history.  The Puritans, for example, saw America as the embodiment of God’s 
chosen land and people, while some of the Founding Fathers saw in America’s rebellious 
colonies an analogous embodiment of Enlightenment ideology.28  Ritter argued that the 
rhetoric of American revolutionary era writers and orators served to unite Americans and 
provide them with a special, or exceptional, identity and supported the myth of a divinely 
guided America.29 
This rhetorical conception of the United States, as a community separate from and 
committed to civilizing a corrupt world, became a central component of American 
foreign policy discourse.  Rhetorical scholar Philip Wander, for example, noted that the 
United States played a critical role in American foreign policy rhetoric as: 
the manifestation of Truth, Justice, and Freedom placed on this earth by a God 
whose purpose it is to make of it an instrument for extending His spiritual and 
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material blessings . . . an Actor with a sense of purpose, an important mission in a 
world of nations, and a moral and spiritual center raising it above all other nations 
forms the essential story out of which reasons are given in support of foreign 
policy.30 
 
A rhetorical focus on politically feasible policy rather than morally imperative action 
seemed incompatible with the image that Wander and others alleged to be the central 
component of American foreign policy rhetoric.  When rhetors focused on that which was 
possible, there was a tacit acknowledgment that there were actions for the state that were 
impossible.  This hardly seems consistent with the characterization of the divine mission 
that scholars have described in the rhetoric of American exceptionalism.  Bush never 
discarded that rhetoric, but his public arguments juxtaposed it with discourse that was 
more prudential. 
Bush’s prudential foreign policy inclinations have often been associated with 
realism, the influential school of thought in international relations that held that the state 
was the preeminent actor in foreign relations and that the state was best served by 
maximizing its own power and preventing other states from challenging its interest.31  In 
spite of the president’s general inclination toward realism, the success of his Gulf War 
rhetoric defied two central components of realist dogma.  The first component challenged 
concerned realist opposition to multilateralism, particularly in organizations like the 
United Nations.  Foreign policy realists cited Wilson’s dream of collective security under 
the aegis of the League of Nations, and the subsequent failure of that dream, as one of the 
perils of idealism in the conduct of foreign affairs.  Prominent realist scholar Hans 
Morgenthau extended that criticism to the United Nations as the League’s successor, 
describing the U.N. and its followers as utopians who failed to comprehend the true art of 
diplomacy.32  The president’s ability to promote the United Nations as one of the central 
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vehicles for the achievement of U.S. strategic interests defied explicit realist opposition to 
organizations like the United Nations.  Bush escaped criticism as a utopian by 
rhetorically advocating multilateralism as a vehicle in service of the realist balance of 
power. 
Bush also succeeded in overcoming a second component of realist dogma, a 
strong strategic opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam. Specifically, his explicit and 
implicit arguments that tied the U.S. action in the Gulf to a broader international effort 
against tyranny mirrored U.S. justification of the Vietnam War as a part of the broader 
struggle against communism.  Many realists strongly opposed U.S. intervention in 
Vietnam, particularly abhorring arguments connecting the war to the broader American 
struggle in opposition to communism.  Morgenthau, for instance, saw Vietnam as one of 
the principal sins of imprudent foreign policy.  He argued that because of the unique 
nationalist character of Vietnamese communism, containing it did not serve a vital U.S. 
interest.  U.S. policy, he believed, was more legitimately concerned with containing 
Soviet (and potentially Chinese) hegemonic expansion.  Committing troops to the global 
containment of all communist revolutionary movements confused moral judgment with 
political action and for this reason was doomed to fail.33  Bush overcame this argument 
by identifying the Persian Gulf War as a new kind of conflict.  In doing so, he coupled 
past principles with the lessons learned by the U.S. in Vietnam. 
For those emphasizing the new realities in post-Desert Storm Iraq, Bush’s success 
in the Gulf was a short-lived affair.  For example, some observers criticized U.S. policy 
in the region as a failure for several reasons.  These reasons included an insurrection 
against Hussein’s rule in Iraq that was violently quashed and a refugee crisis among 
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Iraq’s Kurdish ethnic minority that drew in U.S. forces for protection in Operation 
Provide Comfort.34  Other critics focused on the continued U.S. forward deployed 
presence and a continued threat to regional stability posed by Hussein.35  Nevertheless, 
Bush narrowly articulated the terms of conflict as the simple opposition of aggression, 
and argued that the liberation of Kuwait defined victory.  By doing so, Bush could defend 
U.S. policy in the Gulf as an unrivaled success.  In his 1992 address at the Republican 
National Convention in Houston, for example, he depicted the Gulf War as a clear victory 
for the United States: 
Now, the Soviet bear may be gone, but there are still wolves in the woods. And 
we saw that when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The Mideast might have 
become a nuclear powder keg, our emergency supplies held hostage. So we did 
what was right and what was necessary:  We destroyed a threat, freed a people, 
and locked a tyrant in the prison of his own country.36 
 
Rather than reflecting on the continued struggle of the United States to promote regional 
stability in the Gulf, Bush depicted the war as a discrete foreign policy affair.  In this 
manner, Bush’s war did not threaten to become an engulfing moral crusade.  Instead, the 
war successfully obtained the realist end of diminishing Hussein’s threat to the Persian 
Gulf region. 
As this study will show, Bush employed public arguments that successfully 
justified U.S. military action in the Gulf, characterizing that action’s aftermath as a 
military victory.  Although Bush believed that realist policy making was distinct from 
rhetoric, his Gulf War oratory transcended this distinction by embracing a discourse that 
merged realist means and ends with prior themes of American exceptionalism.  He did 
this while also overcoming lingering reservations about U.N. multilateralism and post-
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Vietnam military engagement.  Before I demonstrate how Bush accomplished this, I will 
offer a more complete explanation of the rhetor and the rhetorical situation that he faced. 
The Rhetor:  President George Herbert Walker Bush 
 President George Herbert Walker Bush was born in 1924, the son of Prescott 
Bush and Dorothy Walker Bush, both of whom would have a significant influence on his 
later political life.  From Dorothy, he learned an abiding sense of humility, as she 
constantly cautioned him against the perils of self-importance.37  From his father Prescott, 
who eventually served as U.S. Senator representing Connecticut,  Bush learned the 
significance of service, as his father often spoke of “‘giving something back’ to the 
society that had treated him so well.”38 
 George Bush first acted upon that sense of service by enlisting in the U.S. Navy 
after graduating from the prestigious Phillips Academy in Andover, CT.  He became the 
youngest fighter pilot in the Second World War and distinguished himself in combat. 
Bush’s military service was a significant constituent of his political ethos in later life.  As 
he would later reflect of his experience, “Those memories were constantly in my mind 
when we were discussing committing troops and estimating expected combat losses . . . 
having been in combat rounded out my awareness of the human cost of war.”39 
After the war, Bush attended Yale and started a family, marrying Barbara Pierce 
and having a son, future president George Walker Bush.40  He eventually entered the oil 
business, a venture which ultimately led him to Houston, TX, where he first entered 
politics in that city as the chair of the Harris County (TX) Republican Party in 1962, 
beginning a career that included a great variety of elected and assigned political posts.  
Although he lost a bid for U.S. Senate in 1964, Bush won two consecutive terms in the 
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U.S. House of Representatives in 1966 and 1968.  In 1970 after a second failed Senate 
campaign, President Richard Nixon appointed Bush to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations.  Bush followed that with a brief stint as chair of the Republican National 
Committee.  Bush, who had proven himself an adept diplomat, was appointed by Nixon’s 
successor, Gerald Ford, to serve as head of the American Liaison Office in the 
People’s Republic of China.41  Although Bush entered his diplomatic career with little 
experience in foreign policy, his diplomatic experience with the United Nations and 
China marked him as a foreign policy insider.  This would lead Bush to take a more 
hands-on approach to issues of foreign policy than in any other area of his future 
presidency. 
Ford subsequently nominated Bush to succeed William Colby as the Director of 
Central Intelligence.  Departing after Carter’s inauguration,42  Bush eventually resumed 
his political life in a bid for the 1980 Republican nomination for the Presidency, which 
ultimately earned him the slot as Ronald Reagan’s Vice-Presidential running mate. 
Bush’s political and diplomatic experience served him well as Vice President.  When he 
successfully campaigned for the Presidency in 1988, he relied heavily on the foreign 
policy successes of the Reagan administration, in addition to his extensive political 
résumé.  As such, political observers portrayed his pending presidency as an extension of 
Reagan’s.  This fact troubled Bush, who believed that his own style of leadership 
depended less on that quality most firmly associated with Reagan, the Great 
Communicator:  a predisposition toward rhetoric.43  As speechwriter Mary Kate Cary 
observed, “Bush knew that he wasn’t that good with public speeches, that he wasn’t 
Reagan.”44 
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 Bush’s rhetorical ability was more of a detriment than an asset in his bid for the 
Oval Office.  The President would have been unlikely to challenge such an assessment, as 
he himself placed little value in rhetoric as a component of leadership.45  However, a 
world slowly emerging from the bilateral hostilities of the Cold War era tested his 
willingness and ability to exercise rhetorical leadership. 
The Rhetorical Context:  The Post Cold-War Era 
 On June 12, 1987, when President Reagan exclaimed, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down 
that wall,”46 few imagined that the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War 
would soon become a reality.  The collapse of the Soviet Union that culminated in 1991 
shifted the international geopolitical map and the framework of U.S. foreign policy.  
From the end of World War II to the late 1980s, the global confrontation between the 
planet’s two dominant hegemonic forces provided the prevailing rhetorical context for all 
foreign policy initiatives and actions.  Rhetorical critic Thomas Kane argued that the 
Cold War functioned as a frame of reference by which observers might comprehend the 
events that occurred within that era’s “lifespan.”47 
 American Cold War rhetoric challenged communist expansion and ideologies 
throughout the world, depicting the struggle against these forces as a moral crusade.  In 
some ways, foreign policy realists distinguished this from the actual conduct of the Cold 
War itself, which was more concerned with the practical implications of rivalry between 
the United States and the Soviet Union.  The conduct of foreign policy was, itself, more a 
practical matter conducted by rational policymakers to combat the destabilizing influence 
of Soviet imperial aspirations and revolutionary violence than the moral crusade that 
policymakers often depicted in U.S. rhetoric.  Jerel Rosati, a former research associate at 
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the foreign affairs division of the Congressional Research Service, noted that the 
moralizing tendency in U.S. foreign policy justifications frequently contained moral 
hyperbole regarding policy goals while actually engaging in policy that involved the 
pursuit of national interest distinct from those aforementioned goals.48 
Rhetorical scholars have largely acknowledged Reagan as one of the central 
rhetorical figures of the Cold War.  Rhetorical scholar Robert Ivie noted in 1984 that 
Reagan was concerned with making a strong but reasonable case against Soviet 
communism in order to build support for his foreign policy choices.49  Ivie and fellow 
rhetorician Kurt Ritter claimed that Reagan’s characterization of the Soviet Union as the 
“evil empire” became the catchphrase for “the first President to succeed in engaging the 
Soviets in a genuine program of nuclear arms reduction.”50  While Reagan often appeared 
to rely on arguments that depicted the Cold War struggle in moral terms, political 
scientist Charles A. Hantz noted that Reagan remained constrained by the realist 
framework of American foreign policy, such that Reagan’s rhetoric always served a 
strategic rather than an intentionally and morally provocative end.51 
 As the Cold War ended, foreign policymakers could no longer simply rely on the 
U.S.-Soviet conflict to frame their public arguments.52  Political scientist and rhetorical 
critic Mary Stuckey noted the difficulties that these changes posed for policymakers, as 
those policymakers no longer possessed a mutual vocabulary for describing the conduct 
of foreign policy.53  Historical circumstances compelled Bush to face a new world devoid 
of bilateral U.S.-Soviet hostility and the familiar language that accompanied it.  He 
confronted the new historical foreign policy context on August 2, 1990, in remarks 
delivered to a symposium of international leaders at the Aspen Institute.  These 
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comments addressed new threats “wholly unrelated to the previous patterns of the U.S. 
Soviet relationship.”54  As he argued:   
And what we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant 
changes we are witnessing without neglecting the enduring realities that will 
continue to shape our security strategy, a policy of peacetime engagement every 
bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's 
world as in the time of conflict and cold war.  
 
Among those new realities was the emerging situation in the Persian Gulf.   
 
The Rhetorical Context:  The Persian Gulf 
 The United States has long considered the Persian Gulf region of the Middle East 
to be an area of strategic interest, as national security has become indistinguishable from 
energy security.  To that end, the U.S. has maintained varied relationships with the 
region’s leaders.  For several years, one of the most important of these regional 
relationships was with the Shah of Iran,55 a relationship curtailed in the late 1970s with 
the rise of fundamentalist forces lead by the Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shiite cleric who 
successfully ousted the Shah from power.  The rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran posed 
considerable difficulty for U.S. policymakers, as the regime was explicitly hostile to the 
United States—a hostility which lead to the taking of American hostages by radical 
forces in that nation.56  The taking of the hostages, a source of distress for many 
Americans and a fact that magnified existing anxiety over energy security,57 likely played 
a significant role in the defeat of incumbent President Carter by Ronald Reagan in 
1980.58 
 U.S. security policy in the Gulf was concerned with the potential destabilization 
of the region by the Iranian revolution.59  This led the U.S. to pursue a strategic 
relationship with the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein in neighboring Iraq.60  Iraq and 
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Iran had a long history of mutual animosity, which the U.S. could exploit to its 
advantage.  The United States government began to lose faith in Hussein by the late 
1980s after a bloody regional conflict between Iran and Iraq.  Even with that lack of 
confidence, few in the administration envisioned that on August 1, 1990, on the same day 
as President Bush’s address in Aspen,61 Iraqi forces would forcibly invade and occupy 
neighboring Kuwait.  Iraqi aggression served as a reminder of the need for vigilance in 
the Post-Cold War era, a fact that Bush noted in his Aspen address: 
The brutal aggression launched last night against Kuwait illustrates my central 
thesis:   Notwithstanding the alteration in the Soviet threat, the world remains a 
dangerous place with serious threats to important U.S. interests wholly unrelated 
to the earlier patterns of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.  These threats, as we’ve 
seen just in the last 24 hours, can arise suddenly, unpredictably, and from 
unexpected quarters.  U.S. interests can be protected only with capability which is 
in existence and which is ready to act without delay.62 
 
As with Iran, Iraq and Kuwait had a long history of mutual animosity.  Kuwait, a 
small but prosperous emirate in the Gulf, was one of the region’s largest producers of 
petroleum, and a combination of historic animosity, intense poverty, and sheer 
expansionist intent guided Saddam Hussein to direct that invasion.63 
Although Iraq’s military action surprised the President’s closest advisors, Hussein 
might have believed that his invasion had the tacit support of the Bush administration.  
When the Iraqis asked U.S. diplomat April Glaspie how the United States would react to 
a hypothetical invasion, the regime was told that the United States did not have an 
“opinion on inter-Arab disputes like your border dispute with Kuwait.”64  While critics 
argued that Glaspie was acting as a surrogate for the administration in suggesting U.S. 
neutrality, many failed to note that she had also indicated that the U.S. “could never 
excuse settlement of disputes by any but peaceful means.”65 
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Just as the realities of the Cold War’s end forcibly confronted Bush, so did 
Hussein, in an altogether different manner.  While the U.S. position valued stability and 
the absence of conflict, Hussein’s rhetoric took a Pan-Arab, anti-Western tone.  
Concerned that the Cold War’s end would leave Iraq neglected by its former benefactors 
in the United States, Hussein sought greater regional influence, and made no secret of 
Iraq’s territorial aspirations in Kuwait.66 
Bush announced troop deployments to Saudi Arabia, presumably to prevent an 
invasion of that and the other Gulf states, on August 9, 1990 under the title Operation 
Desert Shield.  According to James P. Pffifner, a professor of public policy at George 
Mason University, Bush initiated a major rhetorical offensive against Saddam Hussein in 
an address on August 12, without prior consultation from his foreign policy advisers.67  
The speech was volatile, laden with ad hominem attacks against Hussein.  Bush would 
take a more diplomatic tone in attaining international support for United Nations 
Resolution 661, which called for an international embargo against Iraq, and Resolution 
665, which authorized a blockade to enforce the embargo.  Over the coming months, U.S. 
military strength in Saudi Arabia grew considerably, providing the U.S. with the 
necessary force levels to remove Iraq compulsorily from Kuwait. 
On November 29, 1990, the U.S. successfully sponsored U.N. Resolution 678, 
which provided Iraq with a deadline of January 15, 1991, for a complete withdrawal of 
forces from Kuwait, authorizing the members of the United Nations to use “all necessary 
means” to “restore international peace and security in the area.”68  On the evening of 
January 16, 1991, President Bush delivered an address to the nation that announced the 
initiation of Operation Desert Storm, an international military effort led by the U.S., to 
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remove Iraq forcibly from Kuwait.  By February 27, 1991, military domination by the 
U.S.-led coalition forced Iraqi troops to retreat from Kuwait. Bush proceeded to 
announce a cease-fire, ending a war that many in the United States and the world 
perceived as a significant victory for Bush and his administration.69 
Affirmative reactions to U.S. policy rhetoric from domestic audiences were a 
characteristic of George H. W. Bush’s Iraq policy.  In spite of some early partisan 
legislative opposition to increased U.S. engagement in the region,70 Bush received 
persistent domestic support for U.S. efforts in the region before and during the first war 
in the Gulf.71 
The stated and explicit objective of the coalition forces during the initial Desert 
Shield phase of the first Gulf War was the defense of Saudi territory from a potential 
Iraqi incursion after Iraq’s successful occupation of Kuwait.  When Desert Shield gave 
way to Desert Storm, the U.S. policy ultimately shifted to the forced withdrawal of all 
Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory.  The Bush administration wished to maintain the 
international coalition that facilitated U.S. efforts to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  
This partially explained why military action during Operation Desert Storm was never 
explicitly concerned with directly eliminating the sovereign authority of Hussein regime.  
Any efforts that might have exceeded the perceived international mandate for action in 
the Gulf would have disrupted that alliance, a fact not lost on the administration.72 
That should not suggest that the administration was incapable of accomplishing 
its own unilateral goals in that conflict, but that those goals were necessarily limited in 
order to maintain the support of participants in the multilateral alliance.  Neither should 
this suggest that any rhetorical defense of Persian Gulf policy would require little effort, 
    
19
in spite of the relative ease of the mission.  Military commentator Anthony Cordesman 
explained that the successive Iraq policy failures of Bush’s successors, William J. Clinton 
and George W. Bush, resulted from their inability to engage in a successful public 
defense of United States policy toward Iraq.  That inability culminated in the current 
administration’s miscalculation regarding support for potential military action against 
Iraq among members of the United Nations and its own traditional allies in Europe and 
the near and Middle East.73 
George H.W. Bush’s rhetorical success regarding the Persian Gulf conflict stood 
in marked contrast to the popular conception of his own rhetorical prowess.  Andrew 
Furgeson, a Bush speechwriter, said that Bush “thought of speeches as superficial P.R. 
events.”74  In spite of this rhetorical reluctance, Furgeson described Bush as well aware of 
the impact of a presidential statement.  Knowing this, Bush and his staff carefully 
constructed what Bush said in light of that knowledge, which Furgeson claims was 
especially true regarding his rhetoric on the Gulf War.75  The negative perception of 
Bush’s rhetorical ability versus the relative success of his rhetorical performance during 
the Gulf War is the subject of this dissertation.   
Managing domestic support for foreign policy action has been rhetorically 
challenging.  Focusing on messages and the context in which policy discourse creates 
those messages has helped to provide insight into how audiences perceived various 
policies as legitimate.  According to Richard A. Melanson, the process of policy 
legitimation inextricably tied that legitimacy to rhetoric, as presidential administrations 
attempt to justify foreign policy as both desirable, such that the policy expresses 
objectives valuable to the audience, and feasible, such that the policy will achieve those 
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objectives.76  Various rhetorical examinations of the foreign policy speeches of 
George H.W. Bush during the first U.S.-Iraq Gulf War provided some insight into how 
the president successfully employed rhetoric to such ends.77 
Rhetorical critics generally regarded Bush’s effort in the first Gulf War a 
rhetorical, if not an ethical success.  Robert L. Ivie, for example, argued that President 
Bush’s use of rhetoric during the first Gulf War represented a historical addiction to the 
rhetoric of tragic fear that had dominated the Cold War.78  By demonizing Hussein and 
elevating the United States mission in the region, Bush continued “the cycle of national 
redemption through the bloody ritual of tragic victimage” that had been learned in the 
U.S. struggle against communism.79  Carol K. Winkler contended that Bush’s framing of 
Iraq as a terrorist opponent rather than a conventional military foe coincided with abrupt 
shifts in public opinion that favored the administration’s efforts in the region.80 
Thomas Kane and Mary Stuckey also saw traces of Cold War rhetoric in Bush’s 
effort,81 which should come as little surprise given Bush’s association with that conflict 
through his years of government service.  Kane argued that many of the central 
ideological premises that guided the Cold War had not been so much abandoned as 
modified, as economic dualism has replaced “prophetic dualism.”  “Prophetic dualism,” 
according to Wander, involved the rhetorical unification of nationalism and spirituality in 
that the U.S. became the embodiment of good while its foreign policy contraries 
represented biblical evil, which Kane believed would be juxtaposed upon economic haves 
and have-nots.82  Kane argued that the language of foreign policy would ultimately shape 
the order that emerged from the end of the Cold War, and thus far, that language showed 
little substantive difference from prior forms.  Stuckey maintained that the foreign policy 
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contingencies of the post-Cold War era require the adaptation of old forms to new 
situations.  George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, she argued, embraced a hybridized style 
of foreign policy rhetoric, which cast the world in similar terms, but were better adapted 
to the altered historical circumstances, such that the world remained gripped in similar 
Manichean struggles, but the antagonists differed from their Cold War forbears in name 
and circumstance.83 
Stuckey and Kathleen M. German noted the substantial parallels between Bush’s 
rhetoric in the Gulf and the rhetoric of World War II.84  Stuckey found broad parallels 
between Bush’s rhetoric and that rhetoric used to justify participation in World War II. 
Bush specifically relied on the analogy that failing to stop Hussein was akin to the failure 
of allied forces to stop Hitler in Munich.  German declared that Bush’s use of directive 
language overcame American public memory about Vietnam.  She argued that directive 
language also imbued policy toward Iraq with the divine sense of mission that frequently 
characterizes American exceptionalist foreign policy rhetoric.  Rachel Martin Harlow 
found that Bush derived a sense of rhetorical authority by framing the agents in the 
conflict through dialectically opposed terms, allowing Bush “to polarize the conflict and 
identify who belonged on which side.”85 
Roy Joseph focused on Bush’s use of the phrase “New World Order,” which he 
employed to persuade “the international community that his political style was based on 
consultative leadership and not on hegemony.”86  However, Joseph noted that Bush’s 
failure to articulate his vision of the New World Order more explicitly permitted a series 
of varied “misconceptions” that undermined a more explicit “fulfillment of the United 
Nations Charter.”87  Aside from Joseph’s work, scholars have paid little attention to the 
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nature of the United Nations and the sense of rhetorical authority that Bush’s arguments 
derived for action among national and international audiences.88  Viewing the success of 
George H.W. Bush’s rhetoric during the first Gulf War, particularly in light of the 
failures of subsequent administrations to defend U.S. military policy toward Iraq, raises 
some important questions. 
 How did the administration tailor its rhetoric to address the public’s concerns 
about the United Nations and the risks of military action in the Gulf?  Why does the 
public often recall the Gulf War as a victory for the Bush administration?  Does the 
instability that characterized Iraq after the war seem to contradict much of the 
administration’s alleged humanitarian ends? 
While there has been considerable research on the first Gulf War, only a fragment 
of that literature has addressed it from a rhetorical perspective.  In referencing rhetoric on 
the Gulf War, I am speaking specifically of public rhetoric directed toward the American 
body politic.  This dissertation focuses on the rhetoric of the first United States war effort 
in the Persian Gulf.  I will argue President Bush juxtaposed the seemingly incompatible 
rhetorical themes of Realism and American exceptionalism.  In doing so, he effectively 
created a “legitimate” Coalition that enjoyed domestic and international support.  
Analysis of the rhetorical situations and the rhetoric of the respective Bush 
administrations involves use of several primary sources including Public Papers of the 
President (for both Presidents Bush), the texts written by each President, and archival 
material from the George Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas.  This 
primary research also includes material gathered from interviews with four figures who 
served prominent roles in crafting the President’s Gulf War rhetoric:  the Director of 
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Communications, David Demarest; senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs 
on the staff of the National Security Richard Haass; and speechwriters Mark W. Davis 
and Dan McGroarty.89 
 Chapter II focuses further on the traditions of American exceptionalism in 
American foreign policy rhetoric, and explains how those themes have manifested 
themselves in American political discourse.  This chapter then addresses the realist 
opposition to exceptionalism and its rhetorical manifestation, before offering a brief 
comparative perspective on the rhetorical approaches of George H.W. Bush, George W. 
Bush, and Ronald Reagan.  Chapter III discusses how Bush rhetorically justified 
multilateral action through the United Nations, arguably the antithesis of realist policy, by 
rendering the organization as less an independent agent than a venue for Western 
leadership of the post-Cold War scene.  While some have argued that the U.S. used U.N. 
authorization to gain legitimacy for its actions, for American audiences it was quite the 
reverse, as U.S. rhetorical authority legitimized the United Nations, overcoming earlier 
objections to that organization as raised during the Reagan administration.  Chapter IV 
addresses Bush’s effort to build support for the U.S. mission in the Gulf by contrasting 
that mission with U.S. efforts in Vietnam.  By emphasizing the ability to act quickly in 
the Gulf, Bush implicitly compared U.S. action in the Gulf to the war in Vietnam, 
distinguishing the U.S. action in the Gulf as an isolated, and discrete event unlikely to be 
repeated in the post-Cold War era, which he defined as a likely era of peace.  In doing so, 
he also successfully defended direct military action to address effectively the memory of 
Vietnam that had lingered in his predecessor’s administration.  In Chapter V, I will argue 
that Bush, in speeches and memoirs, retroactively recast the Gulf War as a foreign policy 
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triumph, in spite of the ensuing regional instability, by characterizing it as an event 
distinct from the instability that followed.  This recasting was particularly significant 
because Bush and his supporters portrayed the war as a realist success, without regard to 
how this characterization may have run contrary to earlier arguments supporting military 
action to end Hussein’s continued reign.  The concluding chapter will focus on the 
present administration of George W. Bush, arguing that the use of the rhetorical strategies 
employed during the first Gulf War could address some of the problems that the current 
administration has faced. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY RHETORIC: 
 AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE CONSTRAINT OF REALISM 
  [O]ur power is the natural product of our virtue. 
Reinhold Niebuhr, 19481 
 
For rhetorical scholars, rhetoric is neither a substitute nor a surrogate for policy.  
Rhetorical scholar Martin J. Medhurst explained that rhetoric is accurately conceived as 
an art “with both practical and productive dimensions” including the “accomplishment of 
certain goals.”2  Medhurst offered this argument in response to those critics of 
presidential rhetoric who viewed it as a demagogic and deceptive alternative to political 
action.3  Most accurately, scholars of presidential rhetoric view policy as indivisible from 
the rhetoric used to articulate it.  George H.W. Bush, however, believed that the two were 
clearly distinct.4 
That distinction became more relevant in that Bush’s aversion to rhetoric bore 
parallels to the arguments made by foreign policy realists against rhetoric.  Bush 
speechwriter Dan McGroarty cautioned that although the President “didn’t fancy himself 
as a Kennebunk-bred Kissinger,” the President remained well aware of the need to 
temper his rhetoric by both avoiding excessive foreign policy moralizing and the use of 
arguments based solely in the realists’ balance-of-power orientation.5  McGroarty 
indicated that American audiences were likely to eschew arguments premised solely in 
terms of amoral national interest. 
It may work in a European context, it may work in other parts of the planet, but I 
do not think it will work in an American context.  I think it misses something that 
people see as important, the character of the country and who we are.  And the 
individual who tries to do that will literally at some point cease to be understood 
as speaking about the kinds of things that America can do.6 
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Research by social scientist Matthew S. Hirchberg validated a similar claim in a series of 
studies on cognitive perceptions of American foreign policy, arguing that the American 
people were more likely to support foreign policy actions if they were convinced these 
actions were consistent with moral goals.7 
 During the Cold War, however, this distinction mattered little as morally oriented 
rhetoric often served realist foreign policy interests.  McGroarty, in a fellowship proposal 
to the Council on Foreign Relations in 1991, referred to the relationship between realism 
and rhetoric as “having the allure of a shotgun wedding.”8  Rhetoric during the Cold War, 
he argued, failed to rouse the ire of realists because in “rallying the faithful against 
communist ideology,” rhetoric also “served the interest of realists opposed to Soviet 
power.”9  When the Cold War was over, fear existed that the “moralistic bombast” of 
rhetoric would no longer suit the needs of the emerging moral situation. 
Bush’s Post-Cold War rhetoric, by nature of its place in history, might have been 
expected to differ from that of his predecessor.  Unconstrained by the need to engage in 
“moralistic bombast,” realists could relegate rhetoric to the idealist camp.10  But 
McGroarty’s proposal cautioned against such a suggestion, arguing that  
In the post-Cold War world, this consonance of pragmatism and principle can no 
longer be assumed.  Realists must recognize that, in America, rhetoric will always 
be the lever by which we move policy.11 
 
To that end, he argued that Bush’s rhetoric in Desert Storm succeeded not only by 
offering arguments familiar to foreign policy realists in favor of the war but also in 
embracing the moral expectation associated with American foreign policy rhetoric. 
McGroarty noted that this juxtaposition of realism and American exceptionalism played a 
significant role in Bush’s rhetorical success because depending solely on realist argument  
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without a larger ideal would have rendered far more precarious support for the American 
mission in the Gulf.12 
What follows is an effort to explain how that juxtaposition operated.  In this 
chapter, I begin by exploring the different conceptions of foreign policy rhetoric held by 
Bush, foreign policy realists, and scholars of presidential rhetoric. In light of Bush’s 
aversion to morally oriented rhetoric, prior rhetorical conventions embracing American 
exceptionalism made it a necessary component of American foreign policy rhetoric.  I 
conclude this chapter by arguing that Bush’s rhetoric differed from his Presidential 
predecessor in two ways.  First, it differed because of its occurrence in a new post-Cold 
War.  Second, it differed in its rhetorical juxtaposition of American exceptionalism and 
realism within the rhetoric itself, rather than the simple use of American exceptionalist 
rhetoric toward strategic realist foreign policy ends. 
Bush and Foreign Policy Rhetoric 
Speechwriter Mark W. Davis described the process of discovering the appropriate 
rhetorical persona for Bush, imagining that: 
“Well if he’s taciturn, if he’s manly, if he says what he means and means what he 
says,” who is like that?  And Gary Cooper came to mind.  So I started writing a 
little bit as if I were writing for someone like Gary Cooper.  That kind of gave me 
a mental trick that I used, not to really write for the President, but to get myself in 
the mood to write for the President.13 
 
The Gary Cooper image was consonant with speechwriter Curt Smith’s vivid description 
of Bush’s attitude toward rhetoric as part of the “phony baloney ritual of politics.”14  
Bush speechwriter Andrew Furgeson described the president’s approach to politics as 
“pragmatic, not rhetorical.”15  Political scientist David Mervin argued that for Bush,  
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speechmaking was akin to campaigning, which he abhorred and considered distinct from 
the conduct of policy itself.16  
Bush publicly reflected on this distinction in A World Transformed (co-written by 
Brent Scowcroft), where he described a conversation shared with Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev.  Bush cautioned the Soviet leader not to take hard-line American foreign 
policy rhetoric directed against U.S.-Soviet relations too seriously.  Reminiscing with 
Gorbachev about rhetorical lessons learned from Chinese leader Mao Zedong, Bush told 
him to ignore “excessive bombast” and to “look at deeds and actions instead.”17  This 
anecdote is consistent with Bush’s description of his own approach to foreign policy as 
“prudence,” which entailed a more cautious approach to world affairs than what he 
perceived as the overly moralistic style of Reagan.18  As suggested above in the 
recollection of Andrew Furgeson, Bush and his staff often used the term “prudence” 
interchangeably with “pragmatism.”  The President distinguished his public discourse on 
issues related to foreign policy, a product of his knowledge and experience, from the 
“lofty language” and “broad themes,” characterizing the “rhetoric” of others.19 
Rhetorical scholars have not shared Bush’s distinction between rhetoric and 
political action.  In his landmark 1968 article “The Rhetorical Situation,” Lloyd Bitzer 
argued that “a work of rhetoric is pragmatic. . . it functions ultimately to produce action 
or change in the world.”20  Rhetoric is, in this vein, appropriately conceived of as 
symbolic action.  Even political scientists concede that rhetoric is an essential component 
of policymaking, particularly foreign policy.  Foreign policy decisions require public 
support for their own legitimacy.  Edward C. Luck of Columbia University’s Center on 
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International Organizations and Institutions noted that in the conduct of foreign policy, 
“legitimacy matters.”21  Policymakers achieve this legitimacy through rhetoric. 
Policy rhetors often draw that legitimacy from moral grounds.  Political scientist 
Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. argued that the successful conduct of foreign policy could not capably 
dispense with the need to articulate policy in moral/idealistic terms.  As he stated “the 
exercise of power by the United States abroad must be related to some ostensible, 
worthwhile human purpose (or at least intuitively sensed) by the American people.”22  
Luck claimed that Americans believe that their country is “special” and find solace in 
“the principles and values” espoused by it.23  For this reason, Bush could not simply rely 
on a strategic political articulation of the American interest in the Persian Gulf devoid of 
any reference to those values and principles.  The public demanded more of its leaders 
than that.24  Bush’s speechwriters were well aware of this fact, as McGroarty noted: 
Even if one were a dyed-in-the-wool realist and inclined toward realpolitik . . . as 
a speechwriter I would stop and say, “Hmm realpolitik, not an interesting 
borrowing from a foreign language. I wonder if it will translate to the American 
public as they think about who they are in the world. Maybe not . . .”  I don’t 
think a realist can speak in the language of realism for any sustained period of 
time and actually talk to the American people.25 
 
Balancing these perspectives was critical to the success of foreign policy.  
Rhetorical scholars Denise M. Bostdorf and Steven R. Goldzwig, for example, have 
argued that Kennedy’s failure to balance idealism and pragmatism successfully in his 
Vietnam War rhetoric would have likely posed problems for him had he lived through the 
conflict, problems that ultimately overwhelmed his successor Lyndon B. Johnson.26 
Bush’s distinction between rhetoric and pragmatic action mirrored the realist 
distinction between ideology and action.  Realism, the broadly defined school of 
international relations that included prominent scholars and policy makers with 
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connections to the Bush administration, held that the state was critical in the maintenance 
of international order.  In that states constantly sought to maximize their power, the role 
of the state was to maintain its existence at all costs and to prevent other states from 
challenging that existence.  Realists alleged that realism reflected empirical reality rather 
than the normative reality characterizing rhetoric. 
Realist Henry Kissinger, for instance, referred to “the symbolic aspect of foreign 
policy” as distinct from “the substantive component.”27  Like Bush, however, the realists 
also failed to recognize the rhetorical nature of their own enterprise.  Political scientist 
Francis A. Beer and rhetorical scholar Robert Hariman claimed that realism’s “anti-
rhetorical” stance was itself an appeal to ethos, as “one’s objective understanding of the 
elements of power” provided the realists with intellectual authority over all foreign policy 
claims.28  Realist scholar John J. Mearschimer argued that this indifference to rhetoric 
and the embrace of “objective” detachment resulted in some members of the political 
elite and the public regarding realism “with hostility” due to their perception of realism’s 
amorality.29 
This perception may reflect an over simplification of the realist position vis-à-vis 
democratic politics and the role of rhetoric in the public sphere.  Political scientist Joel H. 
Rosenthal emphasized the significance of “politics” to the realist endeavor, arguing that 
the perceived amorality of the realists was simply a misinterpretation of their caution 
“against pursuing desirable moral goals at the risk of disastrous political consequences.”30 
Rhetorical scholar G. Thomas Goodnight argued that the realist rhetorical position simply 
opposes those who “read history, interpret action, measure choice, or advise policy from 
a position outside the political realm.”31  Goodnight maintained that although realist 
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approaches to the public sphere varied, there remained “the Aristotelian notion that civic 
deliberation resides at the conjunction of politics, ethics and prudential judgment.”32 
Scholars of rhetorical studies would recognize a rhetorical component in realist 
prudential judgment that realists and many of their critics would not.  Hariman called 
prudence “the capacity for effective political response to contingent events.”33  While 
Hariman acknowledged the ambiguity of his definition, he ultimately associated prudence 
with the rhetor who “has mastered the nuances of a particular art in order to perform a 
script capable of motivating advantageous responses from an audience.”34  Although 
Bush seemed to embody this conception of prudence, he would likely reject such a 
characterization of his policymaking role as performance.  Such a rejection, however, 
would ignore the relationship between prudence and rhetoric, particularly as it applies to 
policymaking. 
Hariman and Beer identified three modes of prudence:  normative, calculative and 
performative.  They described normative prudence as “reasoning that manages the 
incommensurability of goods,” which they argue was often oversimplified as “ethical 
reasoning in a political context.”35  This simplification often resulted in the dismissal of 
normative prudence as idealism, in that it assumes that there is a “radical plurality of 
goods” that are contested in a political struggle rather than the scarcity of goods for 
realists who more narrowly define those resources.  Where normative prudence was 
centrally concerned with the ends of a course of action, calculative prudence was 
concerned with the means of policy and involved the gathering of knowledge in order to 
make “valid predictions about specific actions.”36  This definition of prudence was 
consistent with both Bush’s and some realists’ conception of that term, in that it 
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centralized the means rather than the ends of action as the central component of 
reasoning. 
The third mode of prudence that Hariman and Beer identified, performative 
prudence, acknowledged the public dimension of reasoning as it concerned “the effective 
performance of one’s role” which ultimately involved the management of “appearances 
for political effect.”37  Hariman and Beer argued that prudent scholars and policymakers 
could best understand prudence as involving all three modes, while they cautioned 
against the reliance on any one mode.  As they noted: 
Normative prudence is prone to moralizing and excessive credulity.  Calculative 
prudence is disposed to isolation, hypertechnicality, and paranoia.  Performative 
prudence is susceptible to forgetting about effects amidst the intrinsic satisfaction 
of putting on a good show.38 
 
Hariman and Beer also found that although realist reliance on calculative prudence might 
prove otherwise, realists often did acknowledge that the performative dimension of 
prudence was indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy, albeit with some hesitation.  
In the Bush White House, for instance, there was occasionally tension between the 
speechwriting office and other executive departments concerning the President’s public 
utterances.  Concerning foreign policy, much of that tension existed between the National 
Security Council and the speechwriters.  As Bush’s Director of Communications, David 
Demarest noted: 
The NSC, and that staff, view themselves as kind of the last word in foreign 
policy. . .We had occasions where there would be some real arguments that the 
speech writers are to write the speech and not the NSC.  The NSC is to provide 
the content, and so there were several instances . . .we had some donnybrooks 
over “This is the President’s speech, this isn’t an NSC speech.”39 
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These events were similarly recollected by NSC member Richard Haass: 
 
I think that there is a quite a structural tension between the speechwriters’ 
fundamental policy work.  The speechwriters believe that they ought to have 
principal control over the President’s public speaking and quite honestly, I did 
not.40 
 
Bush could not dismiss the significance of the performative dimension of prudence, nor 
could he ignore the normative dimension, both of which he seemed to associate with 
Reagan’s style, while embracing the calculative.  Successful policymaking required a 
balance of the three. 
If political observers solely emphasized the normative and calculative dimensions 
of prudence, then Bush’s ability to gain strong political support for action against the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the face of such a clear violation of state sovereignty seemed 
to require little rhetorical exertion by the president.  Public opinion research supported 
this conclusion.  For example, political scientist Bruce Jentleson, in two separate studies 
on public opinion and the use of military force (the second study was coauthored by his 
fellow political scientist Rebecca L. Britton), found that the public was more likely to 
support actions that restrained state aggression than those that sought to rebuild states.41  
These measures of support assumed an interpretation of events where the public 
somehow objectively interprets “state aggression” and state building. 
The assumption that gaining support for the war was effortless, however, ignored 
the two fundamental difficulties faced by the Bush administration.  The first of these 
concerned the degree to which the public initially opposed military action in the region.  
One study of daily opinion change during the Gulf crisis, as the media often referred to 
the invasion of Kuwait, found that as “the two nations slipped into crisis, the more 
negative the public became about U.S. actions.42  Demarest described polling numbers 
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measuring “whether people would be supportive of armed conflict in the Gulf” as poor in 
November of 1990, largely related to the invasion of Kuwait occurring “in the midst of 
the budget negotiations, and in the middle of the off year elections,” an environment not 
conducive to bipartisan cooperation.43  That cooperation was further complicated by the 
nature of midterm election year, as Bush campaigned on behalf of Republican 
congressional candidates who opposed incumbent Democrats.  By campaigning against 
these incumbents, Bush often alienated those in the opposing party whose support he 
urgently needed to attain his foreign policy gains.44 
A second difficulty that the President would face concerned support from the 
international community.  Those who assumed that gaining support for U.S. action 
through multilateral institutions ignored the tensions between the U.S. and the 
international community, particularly as manifested in the characterization of that 
community in American foreign policy rhetoric.45  This animosity only complicated the 
ability of any rhetor to justify cooperation with that community through performative 
prudence. 
Although foreign policy scholars like G. John Ikenberry argued that the U.S. 
maintained relatively stable relations with its World War II allies through the North 
Atlantic Treaty Alliance, commitments to participation in other multilateral regimes, 
particularly the United Nations, varied.46  JoAnn Fagot Aviel, a professor of international 
relations and member of the board of directors for the United Nations Association of San 
Francisco, noted that conservatives in the United States “see support for a global 
community and multilateral organizations themselves as a subversion of national 
sovereignty.”47  Prominent political figures like former Senator Jesse Helms of North 
    
49
Carolina, who once held considerable sway over U.S. foreign policy as the Chair of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vigorously maintained similar views.48 
From a strictly calculative prudential perspective, those supporting the assertion 
that the war required little rhetorical effort also ignored the tangible political benefits that 
the president might gain by building rhetorical support for military action.  A 1995 study, 
for example, found that a televised 1986 address by President Reagan on U.S. military 
action against Libya resulted in immediate positive influence on his public popularity and 
longer-term support for his broader anti-terrorism military initiatives.49  There is little 
doubt that Bush himself felt that demonstrating his expertise in foreign policy, a practice 
he would not necessarily recognize as rhetorical in nature, would ultimately benefit his 
presidency.  Speechwriter Mark W. Davis noted that the President took seriously the 
responsibility of crafting his foreign policy rhetoric. 
He originated every major foreign policy speech he ever gave and he finalized it 
with his own hand.  He was his own writer and editor in that respect. We helped 
him along, but the idea that someone could hand him a major foreign policy 
speech and he would just read it is balderdash.50 
 
Perhaps ironically, U.S. animus toward the international community is both 
contrary to, and a product of its own orientation in American exceptionalism.  Stewart 
Patrick, a research associate at New York University’s Center for International 
Cooperation, has defined American Exceptionalism “as a pervasive faith in the 
uniqueness, immutability, and superiority of the country’s founding liberal principles, 
accompanied by a conviction that the United States has a special destiny among 
nations.”51  This faith, however, resulted in countervailing impulses.  One impulse 
favored multilateralism in order to promote “open, universal community under law in 
which countries might pursue common security, prosperity and welfare.”52  It also 
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produced the opposite impulse to go it alone in order to protect the “United States from 
corruption or dilution by foreign contact” and to protect the country’s ability to protect its 
own unique national interest.53  In the following section, I elaborate on the role of 
American exceptionalism in foreign policy rhetoric. 
American Exceptionalism as the Basis for American Foreign Policy Rhetoric 
American exceptionalism is the belief that the U.S. is preeminent among all 
nations, and is thus destined to play a paramount and providential role in history.  
American exceptionalism, or more explicitly the rhetoric that thematically embraced that 
concept, emerged from the broader American political culture, which scholars have 
referred to as civil religion.  Civil religion referred to the common political dialogue and 
language governing the American political culture, relying heavily on religious 
symbology derived from traditional Judeo-Christian practice.  Sociologist Robert Bellah 
described civil religion as “a theme that lies very deep in the American tradition, namely 
the obligation, both collective and individual, to carry out God’s will on earth.”54  
American Exceptionalism rhetorically conferred that obligation on the state itself. 
Civil religious language has held a number of appeals for rhetors, particularly in 
its contrasting qualities of ambiguity and moral certainty.  It projected transcendent moral 
authority while its lack of an explicit sectarian allegiance prevented it from becoming 
overly divisive.55  Political scientist Thomas Langston associated the rhetorical flexibility 
of American civil religion with its consistent themes of vice and virtue.  He quoted 
former President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s famous campaign ode to Alexis de Tocqueville 
in stating, “America is great because she is good.”  Langston sees the quote as 
representative of the central tenet of any civil religion “that virtue will be rewarded and 
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vice punished.”56  The rhetoric of American exceptionalism clearly embodies such issues 
of virtue and vice.  America succeeds because she is virtuous.  When this reasoning was 
applied to foreign policy rhetoric, it could be surmised that other states followed a less 
virtuous path. 
Although the first mention of America as “exceptional” occurred in Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America,57 the idea was present in the rhetoric of the early Puritans.  
According to Ernest G. Bormann, the Puritans depicted their new world as one that could 
serve as a beacon to the rest of the world “to light the way for the Reformation still to be 
accomplished in Old England and in all of Europe.”58  Rhetorical scholar Ronald F. Reid 
has argued that in doing so, they simply applied Old Testament typology to their own 
experiences, wherein the Puritans depicted their flight from England as a contemporary 
embodiment of the Jewish Exodus from Egypt.59  The Puritans then coupled this with 
New Testament Millenarianism whereby the Puritans became God’s chosen people, an 
argument so embraced by secular rhetors that it had “profound rhetorical implications for 
American history.”60 
Rhetors of the American Revolution embraced this secularized variant of 
American exceptionalism.  Amidst their talk of rebellion against the British Empire, there 
existed a stream of revolutionary discourse suggesting that revolution was the destiny of 
the future United States.  By revolution’s end, the notion of America as the “city on a 
hill,” was less a cliché than an enthymematic civil religious premise underlying all public 
arguments on America’s role at home and in the world.  For example, William Findley, a 
Pennsylvania politician in the second through fifth Congress noted as far back as 1796 
that Americans “formed a character peculiar to themselves, and in some respects distinct 
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from that of other nations.”61  Thomas Jefferson argued that there was “but one system of 
ethics for men and for nations,” a sentiment shared among the nation’s founders but 
rejected in Europe where early forms of realism had taken root.62  So deep was 
Jefferson’s belief in the unique ethos of the United States of America, that historian John 
M. Murris has attributed the use of “American” as a term of identification to Jefferson.  
Murris claimed that early post revolutionary nationalists who were political adherents of 
Jefferson were among the first to name themselves “Americans.”63  As Jefferson noted of 
America in correspondence with James Madison in 1809: 
We should have such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the 
creation:  and I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated 
as ours for extensive empire and self government.64 
The generic nature of the language governing American exceptionalism enabled a 
wide range of audience adaptation without exclusion.  It provided American rhetors with 
a rich vocabulary and tradition with which to share a common heritage in the ideals of the 
nation’s foundation.  Because the shared heritage of Americans was not always a product 
of family history or geography, civil religious discourse gave Americans the ability to 
adopt a common historically derived language with which to attain unity.  Civil religious 
discourse formed the basis for a common but somewhat ambiguous national culture.  
Rhetorical scholar Mary Stuckey has argued that Americans, including those largely 
excluded from full participation in American life, remain united in their faith in American 
ideals.  Americans maintained this faith even when they find the historical execution of 
those ideals profoundly lacking.65  Philosophy scholar Will Kymlicka described such a 
culture as essential to the nation’s identity, providing “a meaningful context of choice for 
people, without limiting their ability to question or revise particular values or beliefs.”66 
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American exceptionalism justified a wide array of political and social policies 
after the emergence of the Union.  It remained such a pervasive component of American 
thought and rhetoric that historian Richard Hofstadter claimed, “It has been our fate as a 
nation not to have ideologies but to be one.”67  American exceptionalism justified the 
expansion of the United States across the North American continent through Manifest 
Destiny and American imperialism in the Southern Hemisphere.68 
Professor of English Lyon Rathbun claimed that the appeal of American 
expansion lay in its “theologized” conception of the nation, which more readily provided 
comfort to its polity than secularized arguments and its pursuit of an amoral, secularized 
rationality.69  It also provided broad justification to oppose actions taken by the American 
government.  Some extended the trope of the “city on a hill” to imply that American 
policy was best served by making this nation a model for the rest of the world.  No less a 
figure than Charles Darwin connected his theory of natural selection to the greatness of 
America, noting “there is apparently much truth in the belief that the wonderful progress 
of the United States as well as the character of the people are the results of natural 
selection.”70 
Others, most notably Theodore Roosevelt, believed that America’s exceptional 
role required a missionary posture to spread the promise of this nation throughout the 
world, a vision of American frontier extended throughout the Western Hemisphere.71 
Roosevelt was among the many adherents of American historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner, who postulated that the settlement of the American frontier shaped the unique 
character of Americans.72  Turner suggested that spatial limitations of that frontier made 
expansion of indomitable American ideals inevitable.  American exceptionalism, it 
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seemed, caused the nation to swell with its national values and principles such that the 
nation could no longer geographically contain them.  As historian Donald K. Pickens has 
described it, “Americans, combining Puritan moralism and the moral theories of the 
enlightenment, with the millennial hopes of Protestantism” pursued their material 
aspirations through a “sentimental agrarianism” in which all Americans, narrowly 
defined, “held a material stake in society.”73  That stake spread through the frontier and 
ultimately, outward into the world as a crusading force. 
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued that the primary exponent of 
this crusading variant of American exceptionalism was Woodrow Wilson himself.74 
Wilson not only spoke of an America endowed with greatness by the creator, but also 
spoke of American exceptionalism as creating a duty to defend American democratic 
ideals throughout the world.  “We do not confine our enthusiasm for individualism and 
free national development to the incidents and movement of affairs which affect only 
ourselves,” he argued in his 1915 State of the Union Address.75  Wilson then alleged that 
Americans “deemed it as important that our neighbors should be free from all outside 
domination as that we ourselves should be.”76 
Wilson’s legacy in American foreign policy was profound and frequently cited as 
an ideological impulse unto itself.  Historian Anthony Gaughan found that Wilson’s own 
impulses as an intellectual and a professor of government enabled him to locate 
American exceptionalism as an explanation for sectional discord during the American 
Civil War, as the war’s outcome made the country “a great United, indivisible, 
indestructible instrument in His hands for the accomplishment of these great things.”77 
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Diplomatic scholar Robert W. Tucker argued that Wilson’s influence was so profound 
that every president since FDR has alleged to be a “Wilsonian.”78 
Wilson owed his profound influence in large part to his unique embrace of 
rhetoric as a vehicle for leadership.  Rhetorican Robert Kraig observed that Wilson 
sought “to reconstitute American government so that oratorical statesmen would play a 
dominant role” and an impulse which “inspired him to recreate the presidency in a way 
that permanently changed the character of the institution.”79  Rhetorical scholar James R. 
Andrews maintained that Wilson was a transformative rhetorical figure who effectively 
“transformed the long-held vision of America as a shining example of liberty for the 
world to emulate to its embodiment as the self sacrificing defender of liberty.”80 
Scholar Jason C. Flanagan elaborated on Andrews’ work, and found that Wilson 
reconceived of America as a crusading state championing the rights of humankind in 
contrast to the emerging image of Germany as the “violator” of such rights.81  Flanagan 
specifically tied this argument into Philip Wander’s earlier conception of “prophetic 
dualism,” which divided adversaries into competing camps with one acting in accordance 
with God’s will while the other acted contrary to that will.  Flanagan traced this mode of 
thinking more directly to Wilson’s rhetoric even before the onset of World War I.82  
Rhetorician John F. Wilson long ago observed that Wilson’s rhetoric “is echoing still in 
American political discourse.”83  Such a claim should come as little surprise given those 
who have emerged in his wake.  More specifically, rhetorical scholar Thomas Kane 
alleged that those most directly responsible for U.S. foreign policy between and after the 
wars were “products of the age of Woodrow Wilson.”84 
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Although World War II might provide a clearer narrative variation of the 
Manichean scheme governing foreign policy rhetoric, wherein the Nazi’s came to typify 
evil, these ideas still echoed their Wilsonian origins.  This continued through the Cold 
War.  Richard A. Melanson argued that U.S. participation in international affairs, 
particularly in response to the threat of Soviet expansionism at the end of World War II, 
inevitably drifted toward a consensus position that favored continued post-war 
engagement rather than a retreat into isolationism.85  While opinions on different Cold 
War era policies and their respective levels of efficacy varied among Americans and the 
foreign policy elite, there remained a stable consensus suggesting that the United States 
remain engaged in the world to counter communism.  While the material policy options 
varied, the rhetoric of the Cold War retained a consistent theme of Manichean opposition 
to the U.S.S.R.  America was right to challenge the threat posed by communist expansion 
because America remained exceptional, continuing to embody Wilson’s crusading state. 
The foreign policy discourse that occurred in this Cold War context was largely 
constrained by the possibility of nuclear conflict.  As Richard Cherwitz and Kenneth 
Zagacki claimed, “World leaders, even the sometimes bellicose President Reagan, realize 
that contemporary world wars are best waged on symbolic fronts:  the alternative is 
nuclear genocide.”86  This genocidal possibility provided a unique justification for the 
examination of the rhetoric of American foreign policy.  American Cold War rhetoric 
was largely concerned with the justification of extensive U.S. foreign policy efforts in 
challenging communist expansion and ideologies.  American exceptionalism played a 
critical role in all U.S. depictions of that conflict, positing America’s role as one of global 
evangelization of the American ethos.  Professor of history David Hoogland Noon noted 
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that within the context of prophetic dualism, the “reputed greatness of the nation” has 
become “thoroughly universalized, abstracted, and separated from concrete foreign and 
domestic policies.”87  This separation has proven problematic for adherents of realism, 
which has functioned, in many respects, as the private corollary to the public justification 
of foreign policy action provided by American exceptionalism. 
Realism, Wilsonianism and the Reconfiguration of American Exceptionalism 
Historian Robert J. McMahon referred to realism as the “dominant interpretive 
framework” used by scholars and policymakers in assessing the nature of international 
relations.88  Scholars have traced realism back to the works of Thucydides and 
Machiavelli.89  Although some in the United States claimed that American realism was a 
reaction to Wilsonian idealism, other realists found earlier American political 
manifestations of it.  For example, Kissinger has described Theodore Roosevelt as an 
early adherent of realism, alleging that Roosevelt’s foreign policy dispositions did not 
solely emanate from a belief in the inherent greatness of his nation: 
Roosevelt was convinced of America’s beneficent role in the world. . . But unlike 
them, Roosevelt held that America had real foreign policy interests that went far 
beyond its interest in remaining unentangled.  Roosevelt started from the premise 
that the United States was a power like any other, not a singular incarnation of 
virtue.90 
 
Realist scholar Robert G. Gilpin claimed that realism existed in polar opposition 
to idealism as it embraced a “pessimism regarding moral progress and human 
possibilities.”91  He identified what he believed to be the three primary assumptions of 
realist thinkers.  First he posited that realist thinkers presuppose conflict as the natural 
state of affairs, as Hobbesian anarchy “is the rule; order justice, and morality are the 
exceptions.”92  Second, states defined the essence of social reality, as they were the sole 
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agents capable of influencing the international scene.  The third assumption indicated that 
the acquisition of power was the primary source of human motivation such that “more 
noble goals will be lost unless one makes provision for one’s security in the power 
struggle among social groups.”93 
Hans J. Morgenthau went even further with regard to power as the essence of 
realist thought, arguing that the 
struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of 
experience.  It cannot be denied that throughout historic time, regardless of social, 
economic and political conditions, states have met each other in contests for 
power.94 
Realism attempted to concretize interstate relations as a struggle for power.  As 
mentioned above, realists did not consider realism amoral.  These realists were apt to 
defend policy grounded in realism as essential to the realization of other more explicitly 
normative goals.  Kraig, echoing earlier work by Beer and Hariman, noted that realism 
embraced a technical form of rhetoric rendering it resistant to criticism.95  This is 
particularly effective as realists insisted that any dialogue on issues of foreign policy 
must embrace realist premises.  To demonstrate realism’s hold on mainstream political 
thinking, Kraig offered the example of President Jimmy Carter.  He claimed that Carter’s 
failures to adopt a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy recognizing the significance of 
human rights was due to his failure to use arguments oriented in realism.  When Carter 
criticized a foreign policy establishment “obsessed with balance of power politics,” he 
incurred the wrath of American realists, tragically failing to reverse the hold of realism 
on understandings of the international scene.96 
That should not suggest that other Presidents did not engage in realist policies.  
To the contrary, American foreign policymakers often served two masters in the use of 
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American exceptionalism and realism.  Kane, for instance, cited George Kennan as a 
disciple of Wilsonianism,97 but others have also aptly described Kennan as a realist.98  
How can these ideas be reconciled? 
James Arnt Aune provided a glimpse of such a rhetorical reconciliation in noting 
realism’s limited appeal for “motivating mass audiences.”99  Aune indicated that there 
“may be a cycle of alternating ‘realisms’ and ‘idealisms’ in the discourse and practice of 
politics and international relations” that enabled realist rhetors to address their concerns 
in the public sphere.100 
Rosenthal described the paradoxical relationship between realists and American 
exceptionalism as one in which the realists themselves embraced exceptionalism, insofar 
as their policy arguments often situated American exceptionalism beneath the dignity of 
the conduct of foreign policy.101  In other words, the rhetorical justification of American 
foreign policy for moral ends rendered the nation less exceptional than it would otherwise 
be.  Rosenthal claimed that this adherence to exceptionalism came from the belief that 
America best served as “the illustration of an ideal” rather than the belief that America 
had a “special moral role in world affairs.”102  Foreign policy, he alleged of the realists, 
should embody American values without imposing those values on others. 
That ability of political elites to operate within the confines of that constraint, the 
successful exercise of “performative prudence,” might be a determinant in political 
success.  Rosenthal described Dean Acheson, President Harry S Truman’s Secretary of 
state, as a realist who also functioned as “an expert practical operator,” defining his skills 
as largely rhetorical in nature.103  For instance, in defending assistance to Greece before a 
congressional delegation, Acheson argued that if the Soviets succeeded in the region 
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“like apples in a barrel infected by the rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect 
Iran and all of the East.”104  Acheson’s argument so impressed Senator Arthur 
Vandenburg that he said, “If you say that to the Congress and the country, I will support 
you and I believe most of the members will do the same.”105  Rosenthal contrasted this 
rhetorical success with the relative inability, in later years, of realist Keenan to retain his 
own influence in the corridors of foreign policy power. 
For Bush’s predecessor Ronald Reagan, realism could be usefully described as a 
both a constraint and a goal of foreign policy rhetoric.  Reagan, in that same sense, also 
embodied the clear and reciprocal function that realism and the rhetoric of American 
exceptionalism played in concert during the Cold War.  Rhetorical scholar Robert Ivie 
offered a broad explanation of the President’s rhetorical vision of the Cold War as “a 
simple black and white struggle between the forces of good and evil,” making it difficult 
for Reagan to pacify world opinion and leading to potentially debilitating levels of 
military spending.106 
However, such an understanding largely neglects the more strategic components 
of Reagan’s Cold War rhetoric.  Political scientist Charles Hantz, for instance, found 
Reagan’s foreign policy rhetoric was more constrained by realist strategic considerations 
than many assumed.  Specifically, Hantz argued that Reagan was more apt to exercise his 
more ideologically oriented views when referring to less developed regimes opposing the 
U.S., while he demonstrated views that were more pragmatic when addressing issues 
related to the Soviet Union or China.  In another case, rhetorical scholars Robert C. 
Rowland and John M. Jones assessed Reagan’s speech at the Bradenburg Gate, and found 
that despite views to the contrary, Reagan’s legendary exhortation to “tear down that 
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wall” appeared in a speech carefully shaped to reflect a more pragmatic perspective in 
addressing the Cold War.107 
Reagan’s rhetorical success could be described as much a product of his 
bellicosity in rhetorically challenging opponents of the United States as anything else.  
By talking tough, Reagan may have helped to shape policy in the areas mentioned by 
bringing pressure upon those states.  In this way, the direct and aggressive rhetoric of the 
Cold War developed a superior bargaining system for the President whereby these states 
might come forth to avoid potential U.S. aggression.  However, there existed no 
guarantee that in the absence of superpower conflict, states might continue to be, or not to 
be, compelled by aggressive American rhetoric to do anything at all. 
Worse still, accounts of Reagan’s rhetorical success fail to account for some of 
the constraints that his foreign policy successes and failures might have created for his 
successor.  Bush not only had to deal with comparisons to Reagan’s rhetorical style, but 
some of Reagan’s rhetoric either complicated Bush’s rhetorical endeavors or failed 
altogether to address lingering concerns among the American body politic. 
With regard to the United Nations, for example, the Reagan administration had 
what could be described as an adversarial rhetorical relationship.  Jeanne Kirkpatrick, 
Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, situated U.S. tensions with the organization 
within the context of the Cold War.  As she argued in an address at Arizona State 
University in 1981: 
Our relative isolation inside the United Nations stands in very sharp contrast to 
the position of the Soviet Union, which, though it often behaves like an 
international outlaw, is invariably supported by its own client states and a certain 
number of fellow travelers.  It never stands alone in the United Nations.108 
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During Reagan’s tenure, the U.N. was largely scorned in U.S. policy circles, which was 
likely among the reasons that the U.S. reneged on its financial obligations to the 
organization, leaving the U.S. over one billion dollars in arrears by the end of the Reagan 
era.109  Whatever problems, however, that Reagan found with the U.N., rhetorical success 
with regard to the U.S. position opposing the invasion of Kuwait demanded the potential 
legitimizing force that the institution could muster.  As David Demarest noted, 
I think that we felt that you deal with the international bodies that you have and 
the U.N, for all of its problems and challenges was the one organization where 
everybody was at the table and would be able to be a validator, in a sense, of what 
our position was.110 
 
Reagan rhetorically complicated the use of the United Nations as a legitimizing agent in 
foreign policy discourse in such a fashion that Bush would be forced to establish new 
arguments in its defense. 
Much of Reagan’s rhetorical success lay in his ability to employ the Cold War 
struggle as a frame for justifying American foreign policy ventures.  But as demonstrated 
above, after the Vietnam War, the belief in American aversion to war casualties was a 
powerful constraint on the nature of foreign policy ventures.  Reagan’s rhetoric as a 
Presidential candidate in 1981 attempted to challenge the assumption that America had 
somehow sustained a national defeat by labeling the war as a “noble cause,” an argument 
that had adverse political ramifications for his campaign.111 
 Reagan paid a minor political price for his revisionist perspective on the war, but 
in doing so learned a lesson about the cultural understanding of Vietnam.  His 
administration was not ignorant of the significance of Vietnam in the minds of 
Americans.  Many Americans were painfully reminded of these risks in the October 23, 
1983 attack on the U.S. Marines barracks in Lebanon.  Reagan could not easily overcome 
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American hesitation, opting for two distinct strategies.  The first strategy involved 
replacing fear of futility in Vietnam with images of short-term, low-risk military action in 
Grenada.112  The second concerned the Reagan doctrine, which enabled the White House 
to avoid both direct military confrontation with forces that they publicly portrayed as 
Soviet proxies, while also allowing them to avoid rhetorically questions related to the 
direct military engagement of American forces.113  In neither the rhetorical use of 
Grenada nor the Reagan doctrine, however, was Reagan capable of completely allaying 
the concern among political elites that Americans were free of the lingering memory of 
Vietnam, a fact that would become abundantly clear in Bush’s references to the problems 
of the Vietnam War.114 
In spite of the aforementioned examples, this particular case is concerned with 
performative prudence at the highest levels of foreign policy authority.  Few would argue 
that realism rarely serves as the explicit justification for any foreign policy action.  For 
instance, the Persian Gulf remained an area of strategic significance to the United States 
because of Western dependence on petroleum exports from that region for energy.  The 
President highlighted this fact in an essay in Newsweek published on November 26, 1990, 
where he argued that Hussein’s invasion of Iraq was tantamount to economic blackmail 
that threatened the world’s access to vital energy supplies and particularly imperiled 
“fledgling democracies.”  “Energy security is national security,” he argued, “and we 
must be prepared to act accordingly.”115 
But using energy security as a primary justification for acting in the region was 
recognized by members of Bush’s own administration as politically perilous, as noted in 
a memo dated August 17, 1990, from White House domestic policy adviser  Jim 
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Pinkerton to speechwriter Chriss Winston (“Subject:  VFW Address Speech Draft”).  
Pinkerton indicated that among the “spectrum of justifications for our current military” 
that there existed a range of effectiveness from the most persuasive concerning “world 
peace and the rule of law” to the less persuasive (to which Pinkerton parenthetically 
added “though legitimate”) arguments concerning the region’s “flow of oil.”  He noted 
that this “latter argument will be attacked as a materialist rationale:   we are asking 
American boys to die for oil and cheap gasoline.”116 
The memo further pointed toward another argument that opponents of the military 
build-up in Kuwait were likely to make, namely that American forces “are protecting 
undemocratic regimes” which caused Pinkerton to write that “whenever possible,” the 
administration’s justifications should center around the aforementioned “rule of 
law/world peace” arguments.117 
 Bush’s Gulf War rhetoric attempted to blend realist intention with the rhetoric of 
American exceptionalism.  The prior example not withstanding, Bush engaged in a more 
explicit use of realist argument in the public than had prior presidents.  While one could 
conjecture as to why this is the case, McGroarty’s aforementioned concerns about the 
appeal of pure realist rhetoric seem to raise some concerns about its use.  Explaining how 
Bush’s rhetorical juxtaposition of realism and American exceptionalism can demonstrate 
how such rhetors may allay such concerns.  In making this case, I argue that Bush faced 
three distinct constraints.  First, multilateral action through the United Nations, a concept 
anathema to realists, is justified as a realist policy option, as Bush subordinated the U.N. 
as an agency for explicit U.S. domination in the effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait.  Second, 
still haunted by the lingering shadows of Vietnam, Bush took great pains to ensure that he 
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distinguished Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm from the war in Vietnam.  The third 
constraint occurred only in the retrospective assessment of the military’s performance in 
the Persian Gulf, for while problems arose and Hussein ultimately retained power in Iraq, 
Bush historically defined the terms of victory such that what military analyst Jeffrey 
Record labels a “Hollow Victory” was anything but.118  As victory is a term with no 
concrete strategic meaning, Bush constructed one that rendered the short-term application 
of military force in service of a specific and narrowly tailored objective the only meaning 
that matters.  While such a definition seems overly technical, Bush provided a normative 
emphasis suggesting that expediency has both strategic and moral dimensions:   America 
was exceptional because its military can successfully accomplish narrowly defined tasks. 
In the remainder of this dissertation, I will more firmly establish the previously 
mentioned arguments as to how President Bush successfully made public arguments with 
premises grounded in realism by combining these arguments with the rhetoric of 
American exceptionalism in his justification of and for United States military action in 
the Persian Gulf between August of 1990 and March of 1991.  As president, Bush 
adopted a previously unfamiliar role that encompassed the type of symbolic leadership in 
which he had expressed some skepticism.  In embracing this role during the Gulf War, he 
combined his enthusiasm for realism with a public embrace of the transcendent ideals of 
American exceptionalism. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE UNITED NATIONS AS THE MEANS TO AN END:   
MULTILATERAL ACTION, REALISM, AND HISTORY IN BUSH’S GULF 
WAR RHETORIC 
Iraq’s invasion marks an outrageous breach of the peace, a broad-faced violation 
of the United Nations Charter.  And by its actions, the Iraqi regime has shown its 
contempt for the very principles on which the United Nations was founded. 
 
President George Herbert Walker Bush 
“Remarks to Officers and Troops at Hickam Air Force Base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii” 
October 28, 1990 
 
 Few institutions have drawn the ire of realists more than the United Nations.  
Realist scholar John H. Herz described contemporary realism as a reaction to the postwar 
idealism embodied in the U.N. and its efforts “to lead mankind to permanent peace.”1 
Although Hans Morgenthau alleged that the U.N. could contribute to international 
diplomacy, he believed that it left the great powers to defer to smaller member states.  
Such an action might allow those great powers to shift the responsibility for particular 
policy choices to the U.N., but it also left the U.S. captive to international consensus.2 
George Kennan said that faith in enterprises like the U.N. imperiled Western security in 
favor of “misplaced idealism.”3 
Realists feared what they perceived as the organization’s utopian idealism and its 
commitment to principles that did not always respect the existing balance of international 
power.  Multilateral commitments constrained unilateral action, which realists viewed as 
necessary in a world where other states competed for power, and where reactionary and 
revolutionary violence threatened to destabilize existing structures of state power.  
According to Ekaterina Stepanova of Moscow’s Center for International Security, 
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American realists embraced unilateral military power instead of multilateralism as 
“necessary for the compelling demonstration of U.S. strategic independence and global 
leadership.”4 
 However, the realist focus on the ends of policy rather than the means allowed 
realists to recognize the role that the United Nations could play in serving those ends.  
Morgenthau, for instance, held that the United States could approach the U.N. in a 
“pragmatic spirit” to align anti-communist states in the U.N. General Assembly and to 
generate support for Western policy.5  Even then, Morgenthau argued that policymakers 
could not rely upon the U.N for much more than that, arguments echoed in the Reagan 
administration’s often-adversarial stance toward the organization. 
Bush’s use of the United Nations in his Gulf War rhetoric recognized a similar 
pragmatic function in the U.N.  By acting multilaterally, a state actor can attain a variety 
of benefits, including legitimacy for a variety of policy actions.  In this case, I will argue 
that the Bush administration employed three multilaterally oriented rhetorical strategies 
to justify U.S. action in the Gulf War.  First, although the United States unilaterally 
controlled most of the military component of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the administration 
consistently emphasized the multilateral component of U.S. policy in the region, even 
when that component was principally diplomatic.  Second, Bush temporally situated the 
credibility of the United Nations in a new age in global relations, where that organization 
no longer faced the political constraints that bound it during the Cold War.  Instead, the 
organization had the opportunity to fulfill the uncorrupted promise of the post-World 
War II period.  Third, Bush enhanced that aforementioned credibility by rhetorically 
imbuing the U.N. with an American ethos, and subordinating the U.N. role in Iraq to 
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U.S. control.  In other instances, he employed U.N. ethos to legitimize U.S. policy.  In 
doing so, the U.N. inherited the credibility of the U.S. as established in American foreign 
policy rhetoric, while reciprocally, U.S. action gained the legitimacy of U.N approval.  
Before I address these concerns in greater depth, I will elaborate on the nature of U.S. 
multilateralism before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and I will clarify the realist opposition 
to international action before explaining how Bush uses the rhetoric of American 
exceptionalism to overcome this opposition. 
The United States and Multilateralism 
For policymakers and scholars, the term multilateralism describes a variety of 
multi-state arrangements.  Political scientist John G. Ruggie called it a “generic 
institutional form in international relations” that “coordinates behavior among three or 
more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct.6  Students of international 
affairs have long recognized the benefits of acting multilaterally.  Edward Luck identified 
three principal benefits of multilateralism.  First, it promoted burden sharing so that states 
divvied the costs and risks of action rather than burdening any single state.  Second, it 
enabled states to expand their force projection capabilities, as they could use the military 
and geographic resources available in allied states.  Third, in an argument that Luck 
attributes primarily to the United States, the cooperation resulting from multilateralism 
provided political leaders with evidence of higher principles in the conduct of foreign 
affairs, which he claims have long appealed to the public and legislators when presidents 
have sought support for military action.7  The higher principles that Luck describes bear 
less in common with the quasi-religious connotations of American Exceptionalism than 
with the notion of principle arising from a quasi-democratic international consensus.  The 
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popularity of such an appeal should come as little surprise as democracy is a critical part 
of America’s civil religious vocabulary. 
The United States has not always readily embraced multilateral engagement, a 
tendency revealed in America’s more isolationist origins.  Stewart Patrick traced the 
American tendency to “go it alone” to the nation’s early geographic isolation and 
particularly to George Washington’s own admonition in his farewell address to “steer 
clear of permanent alliances with any part of the foreign world.”8  Washington’s 
admonition would receive further support from Thomas Jefferson, whose first inaugural 
address warned against “entangling alliances.”  Perhaps the most eloquent statement on 
the issue came from John Quincy Adams, who cautioned against such alliances by 
suggesting that the U.S might become “the dictatress of the world,” tainted by alliances 
with states less devoted to liberty.9 
Patrick argues that such admonitions led to a nineteenth century foreign policy 
guided by an unrestrained unilateralism.  In the early 20th century, by virtue of its 
continued geographic isolation and its status as a great power, the U.S. opted to engage in 
an active foreign policy having evolved from a “promised land” into “a crusader state.”10 
Such efforts would reach their apex with the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. 
Wilsonian Rhetoric, Realism, and the United Nations 
 By the beginning of the 20th century, the United States had attained the status of a 
major global power, a status ultimately embodied in the Wilsonian ethos of the crusader 
state, although diplomatic historian Frank Ninkovich alleged that war fatigue would 
ultimately lead to a minor revision of these ideals.11  The revision of which Ninkovich 
spoke came in the form of a multilateral institution that could overcome the difficulties 
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faced by Wilson’s League of Nations.  Ninkovich claimed that during World War II, 
Wilsonianism “became the ideological legitimator for a United Nations that was very 
different in conception from the League.”12 
For all of the talk of Wilson’s influence, it is surprising that his most significant 
policy failure as President concerned an organization with which the realists have so 
firmly associated him.  It is useful in this case to identify two streams of thought 
regarding the League’s failure that reveal much about the relationship between realism 
and American exceptionalism, and which I will label the functional and the rhetorical. 
Functional explanations for the League’s failure were neatly summarized by 
foreign policy historian Lloyd E. Ambrosius who cited “pluralism and interdependence” 
as the League’s fundamental dilemma for the United States.  On the one hand, the 
diversity of world opinion prevented the U.S. from using the League as a simple 
legitimating vehicle for Wilson’s political foreign policy agenda.  On the other, the 
increasing interdependence among nations facilitated by the League’s existence 
threatened to make the U.S. a more active participant in the international arena than 
Americans might have desired.  This was particularly significant for Wilson, as the U.S. 
still had a considerable isolationist element within its polity.  Patrick provided a more 
thorough explanation for the U.S. position, arguing that the debate was less strictly about 
isolationism versus multilateralism than it was about the issues underlying broader 
American participation in multilateral efforts, like “U.S. constitutional traditions, national 
sovereignty and freedom of action.”13 
Rhetorical explanations for the failure of the League tended to focus on Wilson’s 
inability to engage in successful public argument in favor of the League.  Political 
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scientist Amos Perlmutter, for example, has argued that public persuasion is a critical 
component of successful policymaking and cites “Wilson’s failure to explain the 
importance of the League of Nations to the Senate” as an argument in favor of that 
proposition.14  Rhetorical critic Leroy Dorsey offered a more nuanced explanation of 
Wilson’s failure, which students of Wilson could neatly summarize as Wilson’s own 
failure to appear Wilsonian.  Specifically, Dorsey indicated that Wilson’s failure to 
engage in transcendent rhetoric linking “American and world prosperity to evidence of 
God’s will” and his inability to distinguish between public argument and private 
deliberation with Congress undermined his dream of the League.15  Robert Kraig’s 
position on Wilson’s failure offered an interesting contrast to Dorsey’s in that it was 
Wilson’s high minded and non-negotiable idealism in an organization that morally 
transcended the differences among states that rendered him incapable of compromising 
with his political adversaries over the League’s future role.16  Rhetorical scholar 
J. Michael Hogan provided further insight in his own recent work on Wilson’s League of 
Nations rhetoric, arguing that Wilson’s failure to compromise made him increasingly 
reliant on demagoguery, ultimately subverting the possibility of public deliberation on the 
issue.17 
In that the focus of this study concerned the rhetorical implications of foreign 
policy rhetoric, Wilson’s rhetorical failure in advocating the League of Nations is 
particularly significant.  It is one of the most prominent events in the history of foreign 
policy rhetoric, as Wilson, the embodiment of the ethos of American exceptionalism, 
demonstrated the clear rhetorical significance of a moral orientation in foreign policy.  
While a realist might be more apt to embrace Ambrosius’ functional explanation for 
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Wilson’s failure, it is practical to assume that both explanations have some merit:   
Wilson failed because the League failed to function as Wilson intended and because 
Wilson failed to persuade the public about the need for that organization’s function. 
While the U.S. led post-World War II reconstruction, Presidents Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and Harry S Truman also succeeded in developing a foreign policy framework 
to address the emerging world order in ways Wilson had never considered.  Where 
Wilson failed in his efforts to promote and maintain the League of Nations, Roosevelt 
and Truman succeeded not only in establishing a permanent international body that 
empowered the war’s victors and facilitated the rebuilding effort, but also in gaining the 
assent of the American people for such an effort.  Patrick explains the rationale for this 
post-World War II commitment to multilateralism: 
The legitimacy benefits of multilateralism are partly a function of one’s 
timeframe.  If the United States fears that acting alone will set a dangerous 
precedent or generate resistance down the road, it may be wiser to accept modest 
multilateral constraints on maneuvering room or sovereign prerogatives today in 
order to “lock in” a set of rules that will continue to serve its interests even after 
its current dominance fades.18 
As Morgenthau suggested, the efficacy of multilateral institutions in coalition building 
explained why Americans remained committed to them.  Patrick argued that this 
coalition-building function was the basis of the bipartisan support that multilateral 
institutions received during the Cold War period:   American policymakers recognized 
multilateral institutions as effective venues for uniting forces opposed to communism.  
But that participation soon became limited to forums where U.S. unilateral political 
interests might be better matched with like-minded allies in organizations like the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, where 
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states could “collaborate on common purposes, express national preferences, and obtain 
satisfaction.”19 
 Such a proclivity toward the pursuit of multilateral alliances with like-minded 
states also pointed to growing frustration with the larger-scale multilateralism of the 
United Nations.  During the Reagan administration, this frustration manifested itself in 
political hostility to international treaties and, most notably, toward U.N.E.S.C.O., the 
U.N. Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization.  Increased membership in the 
United Nations exacerbated this challenge as participating states used the organization as 
a venue publicly challenging U.S. values and interests. 
 In this case, just as Wilson failed to use American exceptionalism in advocating 
the League of Nations, American exceptionalism became a basis for the rejection of 
multilateral participation.  Rather than embracing such criticism from within the U.N., 
many Americans became more prone simply to reject that institution, as it no longer 
reflected the core national interests and values of the U.S.20 
 Given the benefits that the United States could incur through multilateral action, 
Bush had to address a public that was skeptical, to at least some degree, with regard to 
the United Nations as an actor in American affairs.  While actual measures of public 
support indicated that the public generally admired the institution, American foreign 
policy elites, particularly those who would identify themselves as realists, were more 
skeptical, and some maintained considerable political constituencies.21  Perhaps as 
significant was the connection between political realists and the Bush administration. 
Scowcroft was a student of Morgenthau, while Bush’s own considerable experiences, 
including his service as representative to the United Nations and to the People’s Republic 
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of China (PRC) during the Nixon administration’s initial tilt toward the PRC, also 
marked him as a member of that foreign policy elite. 
 Bush also had to distinguish the United Nations, the actor and venue through 
which his administration would conduct much of the diplomacy surrounding the Gulf 
War, from the organization that realists had so thoroughly debased in their doctrines.  As 
a realist, Bush would have believed that rendering such a distinction was critical.  In 
order to accomplish this task he had to distinguish the U.N. in contemporary practice 
from the U.N depicted by realists. 
 In this case, the Bush administration employed three rhetorical strategies to justify 
U.S. action.  First, the administration consistently emphasized the multilateral component 
of U.S. policy in the region, even when that component was principally diplomatic.  
Second, Bush situated the credibility of the United Nations in the post-Cold War era.  
Third, Bush enhanced that aforementioned credibility by rhetorically imbuing the U.N. 
with an American ethos in some cases, and subordinating the U.S. role in Iraq to U.N. 
legitimacy. 
Bush’s Multilateralist Rhetoric and the United Nations 
Defining U.S. Action as Multilateral 
In terms of the first multilaterally oriented strategy employed to justify U.S. 
action, Bush sought to identify clearly U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf as multilateral in 
nature.  Policymakers and scholars could not categorize U.S. policy against Iraq during 
the Gulf War as strictly multilateral or solely unilateral in nature.  Stepanova, for 
instance, described military operations during the 1991 Gulf War as unilateral military 
action demonstrating U.S. domination of the international scene after the decline of the 
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Soviet Union.22  Whether the forcible removal of Iraqi forces actually constituted solely 
multilateral action or unilateral action legitimized by multilateral diplomatic consensus 
confuses the point.  Officials in the Bush administration, however, often indicated that 
U.S. policy during the first Gulf War was multilateral. 
For example, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft specifically indicated 
that the U.S. “should not go it alone, that a multilateral approach was better.”23  Bush and 
Scowcroft have since both acknowledged that they opposed a military effort directed by 
the U.N., claiming that although international consensus was critical to efforts in the 
Gulf, it was “even more important to keep the strings of control tightly in our hands.”24 
If administration officials had offered a more thorough description of such an 
approach, they might have publicly noted that only some constituents of that policy were 
strictly multilateral.  Bush, for example, only explicitly referred to military action against 
Iraq as multilateral on two occasions.  These references occurred during exchanges with 
the press rather than during prepared addresses.  On August 11, in an exchange with 
reporters on the Gulf War, the President indicated, in reference to a question regarding 
Egyptian troop involvement in Kuwait that “this would be a multilateral force and it 
would be a multilateral force with some Arab components.”25  Bush’s later comment on 
August 20 referred to the demands made by Saddam Hussein that “these multilateral 
forces and U.S. forces . . . get out and return to the status of Saddam Hussein’s having 
invaded Kuwait.”26 
Any other references to multilateral military action were absent from the public 
record, which tended to emphasize other components of the policy that were clearly 
multilateral.  In other similar appearances and statements, the president referenced 
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“multilateral diplomacy”27 and “multilateral resolution,”28 but never directly stated that 
the U.S. policy in the Gulf was solely multilateral.  In these descriptions, multilateralism 
described the policies short of military action, generally referring to the proceedings in 
the U.N. Security Council and consultation with other states regarding Iraqi aggression 
against Iraq.  Speechwriter Mark Davis indicated that the President’s multilateral 
rhetorical vision quite intentionally emphasized the diplomatic component of the U.N.: 
What we really meant, and the vision that the President had, was a multilateralist 
vision, of a kind of roundtable of democratic states joined together for their own 
interest and also for the common interest.  A family of nations that shared certain 
values, but were different in many respects.29 
 
In the broadest sense characterized by Ruggie’s definition, U.S. policy in the Gulf 
embodied a multilateral policy, even if military action was principally unilateral.  Bush 
and Scowcroft’s use of “multilateral” in relation to that policy was even more important 
as it represented an explicit public acknowledgment of a multilateral component in their 
Persian Gulf policy.  It also provided further acknowledgement that this component of the 
policy was intended to provide legitimacy to U.S. actions. 
These arguments clearly seemed at work in U.S. Gulf policy, shaping material 
and symbolic policy considerations.  For example, Bush believed the burden-sharing 
function of the multilateral approach would serve as one of the most persuasive 
arguments in defense of military action.  As he specifically noted in a typed personal 
memo to Deputy Chief of Staff Jim Cicconi: 
Where we talk of Iraq etc 
we should nmake [sic] point-always-that 
we are not alone… 
that burden is being shared 
 
that Japan and Germany arev [sic] 
supporting.30 
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In another case, in remarks at a White House briefing for the leaders of veteran’s 
organizations, the final draft quoted former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill: 
Churchill said, it was truly Britain’s finest hour.  Such courage inspired America 
and, indeed, the world, which rallied to the cause of freedom and defeated the 
dark forces which threatened to engulf us all.31 
 
Early drafts of the speech had featured a different Churchill quote:  “Never in the field of 
human conflict, was so much owed by so many to so few.”  The draft was changed after a 
memo noted that the original quote was “inappropriate because it highlights the actions of 
a few rather than the many.”32  The quote that was actually employed emphasized the role 
of “the world,” even if Churchill was initially emphasizing the roles played by Britain 
and the world in bringing the defeat of Axis forces in World War II. 
The Administration likely saw attention to the role of coalition allies as critical 
because the U.S. relied on other regional states, principally Saudi Arabia, as staging 
grounds for action against Iraq.33  Their concern for maintaining that access and support 
resulted in a curtailing of their strategic unilateral goals in the region, limiting action 
against Iraq to the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.34  Finally, and of greatest 
concern in this case, acting multilaterally provided legitimacy to the forceful expulsion of 
Iraqi forces. 
Given this emerging political tendency, the circumstances under which the 
administration might embrace such a framework seemed limited.  However, the end of 
the Cold War might have provided such a circumstance, as Bush could historically situate 
the animus directed against the organization within the context of the Cold War era itself.  
Speechwriter Dan McGroarty noted that through his Gulf War rhetoric, Bush “may have 
meant, in some respects, to issue a kind of corrective, but perhaps a mild one against 
    
91
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and even Ronald Reagan, for whom he had enormous respect and 
reverence.”35 
 The strength of such a corrective may have been borne of Bush’s own association 
with the United Nations.  Director of Communications David Demarest indicated that 
Bush’s diplomatic experience made the U.N. an invaluable rhetorical asset: 
In the Gulf, his network around international associates and colleagues was 
extraordinary.  He was on a first name basis with one head of state after another, 
mainly because of his years in the CIA, as Vice President, U.N. Ambassador 
himself.  He had a lot of respect for the U.N.  He had assets there that were very, 
very valuable.36 
 
There is also reason to believe that the Bush administration recognized the unique benefit 
of the United Nations as a multilateral institution.  In a memorandum to the President 
dated September 28, 1990, speechwriter Edward E. McNally emphasizes the significance 
of Bush’s upcoming October 1, 1990 address before the U.N. General Assembly.  
McNally refers to the address as both “our last” and “our best” opportunity to “say that 
the cold war is over.”37  The “last” reference concerned Germany’s pending reunification 
on October 3.  McNally’s “best” reference indicated, “it’s before not only ‘a’ world 
forum, but the world forum,”38 and further emphasized the significance of that fact in 
light of the U.S. request that the U.N “play a key part in reintegrating the Soviet Union 
into the community of nations.39 
Fulfilling the Promise of the United Nations 
In terms of the second multilaterally oriented strategy employed to justify U.S. 
action, Bush had to convince some of his audience that the U.N. was up to the task of 
serving U.S. interests in the Gulf.  He had to do so in light of prior U.S. criticisms of that 
organization.  For those already convinced of the organization’s ethos, the U.S. pursuit of 
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multilateral cooperation created greater legitimacy for U.S. policy by contrasting its 
efforts with those of its military foe. 
Scholars have identified a longstanding tradition in the rhetoric of war wherein 
rhetors metaphorically depict their enemies as savages who are immune to civilized 
forms of conduct.  Rhetors depict themselves and their own interests as representative of 
higher ideals in order to provide the most distinct dialectical contrast between themselves 
and these savages.  When politicians employ rhetoric to justify military action as a 
corrective to such savagery, they must assure the audience that they have employed all 
civilized non-violent means at their disposal, and have concluded that force is the last 
available option for dealing with the enemy.  Presidents have historically referred to the 
rule of law and norms of international conduct, both antithetical to savage impulses, as 
principles to guide their own behavior and that of other states, including their enemies.40 
 In his August 8 address to the nation concerning the initial deployment of forces 
to the Gulf, Bush described the U. N. sanctions against Iraq as “now enshrined in 
international law,” implying that they had a binding force.41  This argument simplified 
longstanding disagreement among the members of the U.N. Security Council concerning 
the nature of their authority.  Although the modern U.N. did not suffer from the same 
legitimacy crises that doomed the League of Nations, difficulty in attaining international 
consensus was inevitably complicated. 
 Bush overcame this complication by strategically employing arguments related to 
the U.N.’s role in the emerging post-Cold War environment.  He compared the United 
Nations of the early 1990s with the organization as it initially emerged in the aftermath of 
World War II.  This argument first emerged in an address to a joint session of Congress 
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on both the situation in the Gulf and on efforts to control the federal budget deficit.  Bush 
reminded his audience, “We’re now in sight of a United Nations that performs as 
envisioned by its founders.”42  This was in implicit contrast to the United Nations of the 
Cold War era, which east-west division had rendered impotent.43  Convincing Congress 
was critical to the success of the overall mission, and the attention drawn by this address 
would only succeed in defining the situation for the public in ways favorable to the 
administration. 
Bush reinforced this argument by stating, “The United Nations is backing up its 
words with action,” a less-than-subtle reference to prior criticisms of the organization.  
The action to which he referred was the passage of five Security Council resolutions 
condemning the invasion of Kuwait.  This U.N. would no longer be associated with the 
failed multilateral institution depicted by conservatives, as the Gulf War reinvigorated its 
role.  Because opponents of the U.N. believed that the organization had grown impotent 
in the Cold War era, Bush had to depict the U.N. as an agent capable of living up to its 
long-established doctrines governing international conduct.  In an address to a gathering 
of veterans’ organizations, the president clarified the broader role of the United Nations.  
After referencing the Battle of Britain as a rallying point for Allied action during World 
War II, Bush went on to speak of “allied strength” and suggested that the U.S. and its 
allies now vested such strength in the U.N. Security Council whose eight major Gulf 
related resolutions were “setting the terms for solving the crisis.”  He further clarified that 
the conflict in the Gulf represented “not Iraq versus the United States; it’s Iraq against the 
entire world,” an appeal based in the international rule of law.  As opponents of 
multilateralism often presumed that international law regimes were largely idealist 
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enterprises serving as little more than unenforceable codes of behavior, Bush clarified 
this with regard to Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait: 
By waging a war of aggression, plundering a peaceful neighbor, and holding these 
innocents hostage, Iraq has violated every standard of international behavior.  
And we’re not talking about international etiquette here; we’re talking about 
international law.  And outlaw nations and outlaw leaders simply have got to 
understand that.44 
 
 Bush’s most extended use of this argument occurred during an address before the 
United Nations General Assembly on October 1, 1990.  The speech was his first 
opportunity to address the world body on issues related to the emerging crisis in the Gulf.  
While he might have directed that speech toward that body to create an international 
consensus favoring the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, the administration was certainly 
aware of the public implications of that address.  In his speech, the President offered a 
historical recounting of the United Nations’ origins:   “The founding of the United 
Nations embodied our deepest hopes for a peaceful world, and during the past year, 
we’ve come closer than ever before to realizing those hopes.”45  By speech’s end, he 
reaffirmed his belief that the organization was “now fulfilling its promise as the world’s 
parliament of peace.”46  A similar argument emerged in the 1991 State of the Union 
address, albeit in a different form that addressed a central realist concern. 
 Bush’s references to the U.N. in the post-World War II  era drew attention to the 
unrealized potential of that organization.  In the State of the Union address, he referenced 
the leadership of the U.N. as “once only a hoped-for ideal” now realized.  He 
strengthened this reference in an earlier portion of the speech that presumably dealt with 
domestic policy. In it, he described the exceptional qualities of Americans, stating, “We 
are a nation of rock-solid realism and clear-eyed idealism.  We are Americans.  We are 
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the Nation that believes in the future.  We are the Nation that can shape the future.”47  In 
Bush’s narrative, the U.N role in the Persian Gulf made it a mutual product of world 
idealism tempered with the realism that was only a product of U.S. leadership. 
 Just as the initial promise of the U.N was glimpsed after World War II, Bush 
situated the eventual failure of that promise to the Cold War itself.  While the realists 
argued that it might serve a utilitarian function in garnering support for global anti-
communism, by the Cold War’s end, the United Nations’ broad membership rendered it 
less susceptible to U.S. influence. 
Bush offered the Cold War itself as the rationale for the U.N.’s lack of efficacy.  
He identified the East-West divide as the source of the organization’s impotence.  In 
doing so, he never laid the blame for this divide on the United States or the Soviet Union.  
Instead, he referred to a new condition of international consensus, indicating that the 
mutual U.S.-Soviet condemnation of Iraqi aggression marked an end to that divide.  The 
first of these references occurred during the address to the joint session of Congress on 
September 11, 1990, as he pointed to a recent meeting with Gorbachev in Helsinki to 
trumpet the shared opposition of the U.S. and Russia to the occupation of Kuwait.  
“Clearly,” he argued, “no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to 
stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression.  A new partnership of nations 
has begun.”48  In his address before the U.N. General Assembly, Bush indicated that 
when the Soviet Union “agreed with so many of us here” in condemning Iraqi aggression 
that  “we had, indeed, put four decades of history behind us.”49  These statements 
simplified a more complicated political reality in that the former Soviet Union and the 
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United States had very different ideas about how to address that occupation, a difference 
that would pose some problems for the eventual execution of military action against Iraq. 
 Bush went further in addressing the impact of the Cold War’s end in his address 
to the U.N. General Assembly.  Bush embraced the historical-descriptive and 
metaphorical dimensions of the Cold War when he referred to the chilling impact of the 
Cold War on the U.N., past, present, and future: 
We are hopeful that the machinery of the United Nations will no longer be frozen 
by the divisions that plagued us during the Cold War, that at last—long last—we 
can build new bridges and tear down old walls, that at long last we will be able to 
build a new world based on an event for which we have all hoped:  an end to the 
Cold War.50 
 
In this case, the Cold War described not only an era in international foreign relations, but 
also the policies contained therein.  The Cold War would not freeze the machinery of the 
U.N.  Barriers between states, both real, in the case of the Berlin Wall, and ideological, 
would give way to a new world.  As a byproduct of this foreign policy epoch, Bush 
argued that the Cold War’s end offered new, transcendent opportunities for the world: 
We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the Cold War:  a 
partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action, especially 
through international and regional organizations; a partnership united by principle 
and the rule of law and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and 
commitment; a partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase 
prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms.51 
 
Although his immediate audience for this address consisted of members of the 
international community, he clearly kept his own larger audience in mind.  Such a 
consideration was paramount given the attention the media focused on the U.N. address.  
It was also critical in that he reestablished the significance of the United Nations as a 
deliberative body. 
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The role that the U.N. did play may seem less significant in substance, but is 
central as a secondary legitimizing force.  Bush frequently cited U.N. action as 
legitimizing U.S. concerns in the Persian Gulf.  In his August 8, 1990, address 
announcing the deployment of troops to the Persian Gulf, Bush noted that the U.N. 
“approved for the first time in 23 years mandatory sanctions under chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter.”52  In his September 11, 1990, address to Congress, he noted, 
“We can now point to five United Nations Security Council resolutions that condemn 
Iraq's aggression.”53  By the announcement of military action in his address of January 
16, 1991, he justified that action as having been “taken in accord with United Nations 
resolutions and with the consent of the United States Congress.”54  The U.N. now 
occupied the same legitimizing agency as the Congress. 
The nature of that promise was often qualified to ensure that the United States 
role in that world remained limited.  One manner in which this occurred was by 
expanding responsibility for U.S. success in the region.  “No one country can claim this 
victory as its own,” Bush said after the suspension of allied combat operations, a claim 
followed shortly thereafter by references to “victory for the United Nations, for all 
mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right.”55  In referencing the future course of 
U.S. policy in the Middle East after the Gulf War, Bush suggests that peace between 
Israelis and Palestinians “must be grounded in United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.”56  The same address indicated that regional tensions will find 
“no solely American answer.”57  In each case, the assurance of limited U.S. action 
premised in U.N. rules suggested that Americans need not be concerned about the 
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overextension of American capacity, as it is principally exercised in the limited interest of 
the U.N. 
The president employed the aforementioned argument concerning the 
revitalization of the U.N. in the post-Cold War era in order to reestablish the ethos of the 
United Nations as an actor, albeit a limited one.  Doing so was critical to the success of 
U.S. military policy in the region and to broader U.S. foreign policy goals after the war.  
Much of the president’s arguments in favor of the war involved references to the rule of 
law.  Absent the United Nations Charter, the United States had no statutory basis to 
demonstrate that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait violated international law.  While some 
observers noted the longstanding convention against inter-Arab military conflict, that 
would not suffice as the sole justification for American action, as even other Arab states, 
with the exception of Saudi Arabia, were hesitant to support U.S. military action.  Such 
regional hesitation would do little to allay the potential concerns of Americans who 
feared that their politicians might place American armed forces unnecessarily into harm’s 
way. 
 Reciprocating Ethos Between The U. S. and the U. N.  
Bush’s rhetorical assertions of U.N. ethos attempted to restore authority to the 
perception of the United Nations as an agent, but he did not likely intend to afford the 
U.N. with any authority independent of the U.S.  In his third rhetorical strategy, Bush 
portrayed the U.N. as a subordinate of U.S. policy in justifying its role in the Gulf.  In 
others he described the United States as subordinate to the legitimate authority of the 
United Nations, particularly in those instances which would seem to expand the U.S. 
foreign policy obligation beyond the removal of Iraq from Kuwait. 
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In justifying action in the Gulf, Bush left little room for interpretation:   the U.S. 
role in the Gulf was one of leadership.  Bush argued in the September 11, 1990, address, 
“Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership.  In 
the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability.”58  In the State 
of the Union Address, the president rendered the American exceptional imperative of 
leadership a central component of his justification for military action in the Persian Gulf:   
“We are Americans, part of something larger than ourselves.  For two centuries, we’ve 
done the hard work of freedom.  And tonight, we lead the world in facing down a threat 
to decency and humanity.”59 
That “something larger than ourselves” referred not to the multilateral effort to 
condemn and prevent aggression.  Instead, it served as a reminder of the hierarchal 
distinction between the U.S. and the U.N.  If this reminder was too vague, Bush further 
clarified it when referring to the unique ability of the United States to direct the coalition: 
Yes, the United States bears a major share of leadership in this effort.  Among the 
nations of the world, only the United States of America has both the moral 
standing and the means to back it up.  We’re the only nation on this Earth that 
could assemble the forces of peace.60 
Because the U.S. represented a more significant moral and historical force than the U.N., 
the legitimacy of that organization, representing the collective will of its member states, 
could not trump the U.S. representing the divine will of history as its agent for freedom 
on Earth. 
 An earlier draft of Bush’s address to the U.N. General Assembly dated September 
26, 1990, revealed a more prominent emphasis on the U.S. role at the end of the Cold 
War.  In this draft, Bush was to have likened his address to Lincoln’s Gettysburg address, 
implicitly analogizing the Cold War’s end to the end of the American Civil War.  Initially 
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situated amidst the reference to the end of “The long twilight struggle that for 45 years 
has divided Europe,” the speech indicated that the members of the General Assembly 
were meeting “as Lincoln said of Gettysburg, on a field of battle” but then clarifying that 
it had actually be “a battlefield of ideas.”61  In this analogy then, the United Nations was 
Gettysburg, which suggested that Bush was Lincoln, the U.S. was the Union and the 
Soviets the defeated Confederate States of America.  Although the speech then argued 
that as at Gettysburg, “it is time to bury the past and move on to a time of healing,”62  the 
final draft abandoned all references to the Civil War.  This removal should come as little 
surprise, given its suggestion that the Soviet Union was a vanquished foe and the U.S. the 
Cold War’s decisive albeit humble victor.  Demarest has noted that such concerns also 
had a distinct foreign policy dimension, as there existed some trepidation within the 
administration about the consequences of proclaiming triumph over the Soviets: 
He didn’t want to make life harder for Gorbachev and, subsequently, Yeltsin by 
chest-thumping “We won, we won” because that would give ammunition to the 
hardliners in the Kremlin, who were not happy about Perestroika and Glasnost 
and all of that stuff, looking for an opportunity to say to all of the Gorbachevs of 
the world, “Look, the Americans are claiming victory, you’ve ruined us.”  They 
would have looked for those sort of opportunities to destabilize Gorbachev.63 
 
 Another benefit of restoring the U.N.’s legitimacy lay in the more ambiguous 
intent of U.S. foreign policy.  Just as the post-Cold War era provided foreign policy 
makers with the ability to reshape a new international consensus, the shape of that new 
world remained ambiguous.  The only certainty in Bush’s rhetoric was that the new world 
would be one that opposed the use of aggression.  In the early stages of the U.S. reaction 
to the invasion of Kuwait, Bush identified the crisis in the Persian Gulf as the first great 
opportunity “to move toward an historic period of cooperation.”64 
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The benefits of such a period of cooperation carried the significant promise of a 
better world, a “new era —freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of 
justice, and more secure in the quest for peace.”65  By the war’s end, the president’s 
description of the war’s aftermath explicitly fulfilled this promise.  As he noted in his 
address announcing the cessation of major military activity in the region, “Tonight, we 
meet in a world blessed by the promise of peace.”66 
Bush restored the credibility and legitimizing force of multilateralism by 
indicating that the United Nations of late 1990 and early 1991 was an organization that 
had the ability to live up to the promise of its inception, an ability made possible by the 
cessation of the Cold War.  In doing so, Bush rhetorically shaped the U.N. into a force 
that could not only provide legitimacy for U.S. action, but that could also shape the future 
direction of international cooperation, creating a new era of peace.  The United Nations, 
however, remained rhetorically subordinated to the U.S., as American exceptionalism 
rendered Americans better capable of leading the new and emerging world order.  Bush 
treated the consensus demonstrated by the multilateral components of the U.S. policy as 
but one component of the legitimizing force behind U.S. military action.  The U.S. used 
the U.N. to legitimize its foreign policy efforts, but prior to doing so, it had to reestablish 
that organization’s legitimacy by using arguments that situated that credibility in the new 
world emerging from the Cold War’s end. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE VIRTUE OF “DOABILITY”: 
CONTRASTING THE FIRST PERSIAN GULF WAR WITH VIETNAM 
Question:  Let me just ask you:   You talk about you don’t want this to be another 
Vietnam. 
The President:  It won’t be another Vietnam.  
President George Walker Bush 
“Exchange with Reporters on the Persian Gulf Crisis” 
January 9, 1991 
 
 Political scientist and rhetorical critic Mary Stuckey argued that President Lyndon 
Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War demonstrated the significance of public 
argument in relation to foreign policy.  “If a president cannot make a convincing 
argument for a desired course of action,” she opined, “then it is certainly possible that the 
course of action is not all that desirable.”1  In 1968, a young first-term Congressman 
representing a district in Houston, Texas expressed a similar sentiment.  Although George 
H.W. Bush supported the war effort, in a speech text dated January 11, 1968, one day 
after having completed a 10-day tour of Vietnam, he argued, “the administration has not 
sold this war to the people.”2 
 When President Richard Nixon withdrew American troops from Vietnam in 1973, 
the United States found itself in an unfamiliar position.  The war had gone disastrously as 
the U.S. devoted $141 billion to a war that saw over 58,000 U.S. forces killed in action, 
an injury exacerbated by the fall of Saigon to North Vietnam in 1975.3  While defining 
the exact terms for victory in that conflict would prove difficult, a historical consensus 
has emerged regarding the Vietnam War as a failure for the United States.4 
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Given the injury that the Vietnam War did to American exceptionalism, and the 
disdain that realists held for the conduct of that war, I will examine how Bush used his 
Gulf War rhetoric to overcome lingering memories of the Vietnam War.  Specifically, I 
will argue that Bush overcame the memory of the Vietnam War using four rhetorical 
strategies, the first three employed before and during the war, and the fourth one 
employed after the war.  First, Bush emphasized the abilities of the current military force.  
By implicit comparison, he suggested that the military facing Iraqi aggression was not the 
same military associated with America’s failure in Vietnam.  Second, Bush suggested 
that forces in the Gulf were not politically constrained in the same fashion as their 
Vietnam counterparts.  He bolstered this argument by rhetorically constructing a public 
that endorsed military action and that understood the consequences of a lack of support.  
Third, Bush framed all these arguments during the war with references to the limited 
scope of the conflict.  Bush portrayed the conflict as a product of longstanding American 
principles, while simultaneously emphasizing the modest strategic goals and minimal risk 
incurred by U.S. involvement.  Before addressing this strategic contrast in greater depth, I 
will explain the influence of the war in Vietnam on American political thought and 
rhetoric.  In doing so, I will clarify the realist opposition to that conflict before 
expounding upon Bush’s contrast of the Vietnam War to the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  
Bush used this contrast to address the realist concern about the dangers of unqualified 
military commitments while satisfying the audience’s need for appeals to American 
exceptionalism in the justification of U.S. foreign policy endeavors. 
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The United States and the Rhetoric of the Vietnam War 
 Rhetorical critics have noted the rhetorical difficulties faced by presidents in 
addressing the Vietnam War.  Rhetorical critic John M. Murphy, for example, argued that 
Johnson’s insistent reliance upon the rhetorical conventions used by Presidents 
Eisenhower and Kennedy in defending his own military execution of the war in Vietnam 
undermined Johnson’s credibility, portraying him as “a president who could not act alone 
or think through the problems that faced him.”5  Robert L. Ivie argued that Johnson 
trapped himself with his own rhetoric of containment.  In this rhetoric, the war was now 
part of the larger drama of the Cold War where the U.S. could give no ground to the 
forces of global communism.  Ivie posited that Johnson should have instead emphasized 
nation building in South Vietnam.6  Although Nixon fared better politically than Johnson 
as he not only succeeded him but also went on to earn reelection in 1972, Nixon’s 
rhetoric still proved divisive and ethically perilous.7 
The pervasive nature of American exceptionalism exacerbated that difficulty, 
influencing the manner in which the public responded to the war.  Historian Loren Baritz 
argued that the persistent cultural belief in American exceptionalism rendered Americans 
initially blind to the possibility of difficulties in Vietnam.  As he argued, “Our National 
myth showed us we were good, our technology made us strong, and our bureaucracy gave 
us standard operating procedure.  It was not a winning combination.”8 Seymour Martin 
Lipset, of the Hoover Institution also found American exceptionalism culpable for 
American difficulties in Vietnam, in this case because the war, characterized as a “battle 
of good versus evil” rendered “unconditional surrender” of the enemy the only 
anticipated outcome.9 
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 Determining the goal of any specific American military action cannot be a simple 
task as different rationales guided different policymakers’ decisions.  The presence of 
multiple policymakers responsible for any single policy enhances this problem in 
democratic politics.  Although the war in Vietnam was the product of multiple 
presidential administrations with varying rationales,10 the most discernable and consistent 
rationale was the one offered publicly:   the Vietnam war was an effort to prevent 
communism from taking hold in Asia, an effort that political scientist John Mueller called 
the product of a “near consensus.”11  While other goals might have existed, the foreign 
policy elite believed that success in Vietnam was essential to continued public support for 
U.S. foreign policy effort.12 
As rhetorical scholar Cori E. Dauber argued, the most significant lesson that 
American policymakers learned from Vietnam was that “the United States cannot 
successfully go to war without the full support of the American people.”13  Among the 
assumptions underlying this lesson was the belief that support for the Vietnam War 
eroded with increasing casualty rates, a claim that Dauber alleged to be suspect at best.14  
While Nixon might have intended his policy of Vietnamization, the transfer of military 
responsibility from U.S. forces to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, to relieve the 
U.S. of responsibility for the stability and security of the South,15 American 
exceptionalism still sustained a profound injury with the fall of Saigon in 1975. 
 The most significant consequence of the war for U.S. policymakers was an 
increased risk aversion and casualty aversion,16 hardly the qualities of the triumphant 
quasi-divine state portrayed in the rhetoric of American exceptionalism.  The Iranian 
hostage crisis following the 1979 capture of the U.S. embassy in Tehran further reminded 
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the U.S. policymakers and the public of the fragility of America’s global position.  The 
press and public had construed this event as a national humiliation for President Jimmy 
Carter.  A Time magazine cover story noted the growing perception that Carter was 
“inept,” while Joseph Kraft of the Washington Post called Carter “unfit to be President at 
a time of crisis.”17  It rather decisively contributed to Ronald Reagan’s crushing defeat of 
Carter in 1980.18 
Reagan rhetorically restored American pride and offered a rhetorical alternative to 
the narrative of America’s defeat in Vietnam that once again embraced American 
exceptionalism.  Historian Robert J. McMahon noted that Reagan celebrated Vietnam as 
a noble cause and praised Vietnam veterans as heroic figures who were “undefeated in 
battle.”19  Reagan went so far as to defy the conventional wisdom that the United States 
suffered a defeat in Vietnam, arguing, “We didn’t lose that war.  We won virtually every 
engagement.”20  In contrast to the soldiers, Reagan solidly blamed policymakers and the 
media for the alleged defeat of American military forces in Southeast Asia. 
The effectiveness of explicit Vietnam centered-arguments was, however, highly 
suspect.  During the 1980 presidential election campaign, when then candidate Reagan 
declared, “it’s time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause,” 21 the 
consequences of that pronouncement were costly.  Although he subsequently became 
president, Reagan’s pollster and chief political strategist Richard Wirthlin said that the 
“noble cause” speech “hurt Reagan with the voters more than any other mistake.”22 
 Reagan paid a minor political price for his revisionist perspective on the war, but 
in doing so learned a lesson about the cultural understanding of Vietnam.  His 
administration was not ignorant of the significance of Vietnam in the minds of 
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Americans.  Reagan’s policies, in fact, demonstrated a significant appreciation for the 
lessons learned in Vietnam.  Aside use of military force in the liberation of Grenada, the 
Reagan administration embraced a doctrine of war by proxy wherein the U.S. provided 
support for revolutionary groups opposing communist governments.  The use of the 
Reagan doctrine enabled the White House to avoid direct military confrontation with 
forces that they publicly portrayed as Soviet proxies.23  More significant was the 
introduction of the Weinberger Doctrine. 
 In an address entitled “The Uses of Military Power” in 1984, Caspar W. 
Weinberger, Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, argued that the United States faced six 
considerations that policymakers must take into account before committing to the use of 
force in any given situation.  Those considerations are summarized as follows:  1) 
Combat forces should not be committed to combat unless their action serves a vital 
national interest; 2) Combat forces should only be committed with the clear intention of 
winning; 3) Combat forces should only be committed with clear political and military 
objectives; 4) The size of combat forces and mission objectives should be continually 
assessed and adjusted as necessary; 5) Combat forces should not be deployed without 
public and Congressional support; and 6) Combat forces should only be deployed as a 
last resort.24 
 George P. Schultz, Secretary of State under Reagan, took notable exception to the 
doctrine.  As noted by rhetorical scholars George N. Dionisopoulos and Stephen R. 
Goldzwig, Shultz implicitly challenged the Weinburger Doctrine in a speech entitled 
“The Meaning of Vietnam.”  In that speech, Shultz challenged the assumption that the 
lesson drawn from Vietnam should be to emphasize caution in the use of force.25  Shultz 
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highlighted the traditions of American exceptionalism inherent even in Vietnam, arguing 
that Americans “fought for what Americans have always fought for:   freedom, human 
dignity, and justice.”26  Shultz’s address, however, came at a time when the press was 
more interested in the controversy surrounding Reagan’s visit to the Bitburg cemetery 
than to a reconsideration of America’s war in Vietnam.27 
Although Dionisopoulos and Goldzwig argue that Shultz’s address was part of the 
larger body of revisionist perspective on Vietnam, what they identify as the orthodox 
perspective came to dominate deliberations over the use of force.  The Weinberger 
doctrine has more recently been associated with General Colin Powell, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Bush administration.  Powell had formerly served as a 
military aide to Weinberger and likely played a significant role in constructing 
Weinberger’s famous address.28 
Weinberger’s initial presentation of the doctrine in speech form was significant in 
that the doctrine also served as the public basis for argument in favor of military action.  
Rather than restricting the actual policies adopted by policymakers, it provided a 
rhetorical roadmap for policymakers seeking to justify the application of military force in 
the post-Vietnam era.  For example, the first consideration indicates that policymakers 
should only deploy combat forces in service of a vital national interest, a presumption 
that suggests there is an objectively perceived vital national interest.29 
Given the significance of American exceptionalism in the justification of foreign 
policy action, politicians and the public could interpret vital interests broadly, so long as 
they were justified in moral terms.  Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s National Security Advisor, 
and close protégé of realist Hans Morgenthau, was well aware of the Weinberger 
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Doctrine, which he recognized as a response to Vietnam and the bombing of the Marine 
barracks in Beirut.  He referred to the doctrine’s reliance of public support as “amounting 
to a national crusade.”30  Separating such a crusade from the historical exigencies that 
spawned it would have proven impossible.  Bush, however, rhetorically employed those 
exigencies in service of that crusade, if only to differentiate the past from the present. 
Bush, Vietnam and the Gulf War 
That Americans would historically compare the Gulf War to the war in Vietnam 
was, however, inescapable.  One media story that sought the opinion of experts 
anticipated a U.S. victory while cautioning that the U.S. “could suffer the most battlefield 
casualties since Vietnam.”31  The New York Times referred to Bush’s commitment of 
forces as the “broadest and most hazardous overseas military venture since the Vietnam 
War.”32  A Gallup poll released on August 5, 1990 found 46% of its respondents believed 
it likely that “U.S. involvement in Saudi Arabia could turn into another Vietnam.”33  A 
study by the Gannett Media Center found the word Vietnam appeared no fewer than 
7,299 times in news stories about the Gulf War between August 1, 1990, and 
February 28, 1991.34 
Given his earlier expressed concerns about the Vietnam war, it was unsurprising 
to find that the comparison between the Persian Gulf crisis and Vietnam weighed on 
Bush’s mind.  As he noted in a World Transformed, “I did not want to repeat the 
problems of the Vietnam War.”35  Members of the administration, including his 
speechwriters, shared this concern.  In a memorandum to then chief of staff John Sununu 
from Roger B. Porter concerning the 1991 State of the Union address, dated December 
30, 1990, Porter indicates that the speech marks “an opportunity to convey a tone of 
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‘prudent decisiveness’” as the “Vietnam experience is still a vivid memory in the minds 
of most adult Americans.”36  Among the specific problems associated with this 
experience are memories of “the loss of life, the unsatisfying resolution, and the lack of 
decisiveness in concluding the conflict.”37  In another memorandum from Executive 
Assistant to Chief of Staff Ed Rogers to Deputy Communications Director Chriss 
Winston, Rogers commented on an early draft of the president’s remarks to the U.S. 
Reserve Officers Association dated on January 21, 1991.  In these comments, Rogers 
noted the lack of gravity in the speech, specifically indicating that U.S. action in the Gulf 
“puts to rest the Post-Vietnam theory that dictated doing nothing rather than something 
when faced with hostility.”38 
Members of the president’s national security staff were more hesitant to draw on 
those parallels.  Shortly after the initiation of Operation Desert Shield, President Bush 
spoke at a fundraiser for Mike Hayden, the incumbent governor of Kansas.  Among 
Hayden’s credentials was his personal military service in Vietnam, a fact that Bush’s 
speechwriters used to transition Bush’s campaign speech into a relatively lengthy public 
defense of Desert Shield.  However, Brent Scowcroft and Robert Gates made several 
comments in annotated revisions suggesting that Bush not make parallels between the 
situation in the Gulf and Vietnam.  In a passage to read “As a former platoon leader and 
company commander in Vietnam, nobody knows this better than Mike Hayden:  America 
will not be intimidated,” an annotation from Scowcroft reads “Avoid Vietnam parallel.”39 
Similarly, when the speech suggested that what would occur in the Gulf is similar 
to “what we did from Corregidor to Hamburger Hill,” Scowcroft notes that “Hamburger 
Hill provoked public outrage over what appeared a senseless loss of life–find another 
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example.”40  A note in the opposite margin from Gates read, “Why use an example where 
we lost (however heroically).”41 
This was a concern common among the realists, who reviled the war in Vietnam.  
Hans Morgenthau argued that the war in Vietnam was a moral crusade rather than a 
prudential exercise of power in the national interest.42  Fellow realist Kennan argued that 
the war in Vietnam drained critical resources away from areas like Eastern Europe that 
were more strategically essential to U.S. interests.43 
While the realists based their assessment as to the nation’s failure in Vietnam on 
conjecture, it framed the larger concern that Bush faced regarding elite perception of the 
public’s aversion to casualties.  That was not, however, the only concern regarding the 
public memory of Vietnam.  Another lasting cultural remnant concerned the Vietnam 
veteran.  In March 1968, U.S. troops under the command of Lt. William Calley killed 
over 200 civilians in the village of My Lai, an event for which the military subsequently 
tried and convicted Calley to life imprisonment.44  Journalist Phillip Knightley argued 
that the revelation of the My Lai massacre in 1969, coming on the heels of the images of 
intense combat from the Tet offensive a year earlier, shocked the nation, which had 
previously not believed that American soldiers might engage in such conduct.45  
Historian Eric T. Dean, Jr., claimed that after My Lai war critics could depict the 
Vietnam veteran as a “corrupted, tarnished and ruined innocent,” an image that fit into 
their larger anti-war agenda.46  Dean claimed that the incident in My Lai was historically 
contiguous with a wave of national unemployment that coincided with the release of 
1 million soldiers from service and the occurrence of and media attention to a heroin 
epidemic among troops both remaining in service and returning home.47  This contributed 
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to the image of the Vietnam veteran as scorned and forgotten, prompting media stories 
that called them “the most alienated generation of trained killers in American history.”48 
President George H.W. Bush’s early references to Vietnam demonstrated the 
continuing resonance of that theme in American memory.  As a candidate in 1988, in 
written response to a question concerning lessons learned from Vietnam, Bush indicated, 
“Our participation was right, albeit poorly conducted.”49  Bush struck a different tone in 
his Inaugural Address, as he argued 
That war cleaves us still.  However, friends, that war began in earnest a quarter of 
a century ago, and surely the statute of limitation has been reached.  This is a fact:  
The final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can long afford to be sundered 
by a memory.50 
Bush had to cope with what he believed to be the impact of that memory in order 
to address the public’s concerns regarding the crisis in the Persian Gulf.  Based on his 
statement during the Vietnam War at the beginning of this chapter, he may have believed 
that the manner in which he addressed that issue could facilitate the success of military 
action.  Bush, the realist, had to balance the perceived expectations of realist doctrine in 
light of “failure” in Vietnam, with the expectation that foreign policy remained motivated 
by the exceptional nature of America.  In this case, I argue that Bush employed an 
implicit contrast between the Persian Gulf crisis and the war in Vietnam. 
Bush employed the public memory of Vietnam to justify the U.S. military 
response to Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.  The contrast between the war in Vietnam and 
the crisis in the Gulf reinforced the fact that the Gulf war was not the same aimless, 
unfocused moral crusade that realists described in Vietnam.  Instead, he described a more 
focused conflict with achievable ends.  He did so through the employment of three 
rhetorical strategies. 
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First, he suggested that the troops in the Gulf were better prepared for the rigors 
of war than were their brethren in Vietnam.  Second, he implicitly argued that troops 
serving in the Gulf were not constrained by an unsupportive public.  He bolstered this 
argument by constructing a public that supported the war and that was well aware of the 
consequences of a failure to support those forces.  Finally, he emphasized the limited 
scope of this conflict, while simultaneously indicating that the war served longstanding 
American principles and values. 
Comparing Vietnam and the Gulf War Before and During the War 
Contrasting the Troops  
Bush’s first major strategy involved the implied contrast between American 
forces stationed in Iraq and those that had served in Vietnam.  Bush argued that current 
U.S. troops embodied ideal American qualities.  He made recurring references to the 
morale of the troops, a morale buoyed by their overall level of competence and their 
character.  Bush did not argue that these qualities were absent in forces during Vietnam, 
but he did strongly imply that the current forces represented the finest American military 
forces ever assembled, suggesting that they would fare better than any prior force.  These 
qualities also balanced both realist and American exceptional arguments.  The troops 
served the realist doctrine of prudence with their competence, while their character 
restored confidence in American exceptionalism.  In his September 11, 1990, address to 
Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the federal budget deficit, Bush first made the 
case that the American troops stationed in a distant land represented the best America had 
to offer, and he collectively referred to their overall sense of morale, competence and 
character as manifested in their dedication: 
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At this moment, our brave servicemen and women stand watch in that distant 
desert and on distant seas, side by side with the forces of more than 20 other 
nations.  They are some of the finest men and women of the United States of 
America.  And they’re doing one terrific job.  These valiant Americans were 
ready at a moment’s notice to leave their spouses and their children, to serve on 
the front line halfway around the world.  They remind us who keeps America 
strong:  they do.  In the trying circumstances of the Gulf, the morale of our service 
men and women is excellent.  In the face of danger, they’re brave, they’re well-
trained, and dedicated.51 
In addition to his statements regarding the qualities possessed by the troops themselves, 
Bush’s use of spatial references solidified the troop differentiation.  Bush’s use of spatial 
references, that “distant desert” and “distant sea” evoked images of a strange and foreign 
place different from Vietnam, a “desert” with troops that were “brave,” “well-trained,” 
and “dedicated” versus their generational predecessors who faced defeat nearly two 
decades before. 
 By his radio address of January 5, 1991, Bush made that comparison more 
apparent.  As he noted: 
I remember this all too well, and have no greater concern than the well-being of 
our men and women stationed in the Persian Gulf.  True, their morale is sky-high.  
True, if they are called upon to fight the aggressors, they will do their job 
courageously, professionally and, in the end, decisively.  There will be no more 
Vietnams.52 
 
The troops possessed an intermingling of qualities such that no single quality dominated 
another.  They are “courageous,” a quality tempered by their professionalism and their 
ability to act “decisively.”  Any one of these components in isolation might pose a 
danger.  A courageous soldier might enter into combat recklessly.  A professional soldier 
is competent and task-oriented.  A soldier who acts decisively will attain the desired end 
of victory. 
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 In his January 16, 1991 address announcing allied military action against Iraq, the 
president implicitly emphasized this distinction between Vietnam era troops and those 
serving in the Gulf.  As Bush argued, troops serving as part of an all-volunteer force were 
uniquely exceptional, “the Nation’s finest . . . an all-volunteer force, magnificently 
trained, highly motivated.”53  By referring to the non-conscripted nature of forces in the 
Gulf, the president implied that volunteering suggests a greater commitment, one 
magnified by his references to their trainings and motivation. 
One of the more apparent distinctions between the Gulf War and Vietnam lay in 
the nature of the forces used.  The military had to conscript combat troops for service in 
Vietnam, a luxury no longer available to American presidents.  Some have attributed the 
large-scale opposition to the war to conscription,54 so the abandonment of that policy in 
the United States should come as little surprise.  It also provided post-Vietnam rhetors 
with the unique ability to cite the level of commitment in a volunteer versus a 
questionably committed draftee.  Bush further emphasized this distinction by citing the 
direct commitment expressed by the troops themselves.  He cited anecdotes from forces 
stationed in the region emphasizing the significance of their roles, with emphatic 
statements like “Let’s free these people, so we can go home and be free again,” “There 
are things worth fighting for” and “It’s better to deal with this guy now than 5 years from 
now.”55 
This comparison was not accidental.  In a memorandum dated January 22, 1991, 
from Roger B. Porter, Assistant to the President for Economic and Domestic Policy to 
Chriss Winston concerning the Bush speech before the U.S. Reserve Officer’s 
Association, Porter noted among his suggestions that the “contrast with Vietnam is a 
    
127
good one, and one that resonates with the American people.”56  But Porter took exception 
to the portrayal of Vietnam in the negative, such that the draft would have the president 
say that among the lessons of Vietnam “never again will our fighting men and women be 
sent in to do a job with one hand tied behind their back,” rather than favoring an implicit 
positive statement indicating “this time our fighting men and women are being sent into 
battle armed with what is needed and able to use those weapons to accomplish their 
mission.”57 
Upon announcing the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Bush attributed 
that withdrawal to the “magnificent heroic performance of our armed forces.”58  In an 
address on the following day concerning the suspension of allied offensive combat 
operations, Bush noted that “We have treated your POWs with kindness,”59 a reflection 
on the humanity of the troops suggesting that such behavior was exceptional rather than 
any norm of combat behavior.  The troops embodied the qualities of truly exceptional 
Americans.  Bush specifically reflected on the treatment of Iraqi prisoners to demonstrate 
the humanity of American combat troops.  He once more relied on the anecdotal word of 
a soldier himself: 
And then there was an American soldier.  Remember what he said?  He said:  
“It’s okay.  You’re all right now.  You’re all right now.”  That scene says a lot 
about America, a lot about who we are.  Americans are a caring people.  We are a 
good people, a generous people.  Let us always be caring and good and generous 
in all we do.60 
 
The troops embodied ideal American qualities, allowing Americans to celebrate their 
victory without fear that the troops have resorted to the darker qualities earlier anti-war 
advocates had associated with American forces in Vietnam. 
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Bush continued to depict the forces as possessed of noble qualities of character, 
arguing that the forces demonstrated those qualities that were best in Americans.  “The 
America we saw in Desert Storm was first-class talent,” he said. “…And we saw soldiers 
who know about honor and bravery and duty and country and the world-shaking power of 
these simple words.”61 
The U.S. forces serving in and soon to return from the Persian Gulf were not the 
alienated, unemployed drug abusers that historian Dean alleged to exist in the American 
vision of the Vietnam veteran.  Instead, they represented the ideal conception of the 
soldier both in the rhetoric of American exceptionalism, as they knew about the “world 
shaking power” of words like “honor,” “bravery,” “duty,” and “country,” and in the 
realist sense, as they were “first-class talent” tasked with “state of the art technology.”  
Bush, the president so often criticized for his inattention to domestic policy, projected in 
the troops his own prescription for that which ailed America. 
 Supporting Our Troops 
 Bush’s second major strategy involved the public’s support for the war.  Bush 
suggested that military forces stationed in the Gulf were not constrained by an 
unsupportive public.  This concern owed more to fears based on the American experience 
in Vietnam than it was any measure of actual public support for the war.  For example, 
Bush indicated that in August of 1990 even James Baker, his Secretary of State and long-
time friend, worried “that we could get bogged down in another Vietnam, lose public 
support, and see the Bush presidency destroyed.62  This was at a time when the President 
was enjoying then-record approval ratings.63  Bush’s staff was also wary of public 
support.  In the aforementioned memo from Roger B. Porter, he offered a second 
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suggestion in the final draft.  While the original copy read “never again will they be sent 
in to do a job without the full backing of the folks back home,”64 Porter suggested instead 
“they are going into battle with the full backing of the folks back home,” and “the support 
is not just military, it’s moral…measured in the support of our servicemen and women 
from every one of us at home.”65 
Upon the announcement of allied military action against the Iraqi occupation of 
Kuwait, Bush offered the most explicit comparison between the requirements of forces in 
the Gulf versus their predecessors in Vietnam. 
I’ve told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam, and I 
repeat this here tonight.  Our troops will have the best possible support in the 
entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their 
back.  I’m hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long and that casualties will 
be held to an absolute minimum.66 
 
The suggestion that forces had their hands tied behind their backs had been a consistent 
argument rendered by Vietnam War revisionists:  But for the lack of political support, the 
military would have won.67  Bush coupled this argument with an allusion to the public’s 
perceived casualty aversion.  The current public would offer the “best possible support,” 
unlike the public during Vietnam.68  Bush also reassured the public that it need not worry 
about the president himself failing to support the troops. 
In his March 6, 1991 address, Bush did not simply endorse the military’s effort; 
he also indicated that the simple act of recognizing and appreciating the efforts of U.S. 
forces stationed in the Gulf constituted a noble and heroic action.  Bush first noted the 
significance of such recognition in his 1991 State of the Union address.  As he said of the 
troops, “Our commitment to them must be equal to their commitment to their country. 
They are truly America’s finest.”69  In his March 6, 1991, address to a joint session of 
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Congress on the end of the war, Bush noted, “There is something noble and majestic 
about the pride, about the patriotism that we feel tonight.”70 
The president extended this argument to post-war pronouncements as to the 
meaning of the conflict itself.  In remarks made on the National Days of Thanksgiving, 
Bush indicated that the support shown to U.S. forces has made the country stronger than 
it was before: 
We give thanks for the remarkable unity of our people throughout the conflict and 
especially for the strong support shown for our troops in the field.  I am confident 
that our nation will emerge stronger and more united to face the challenges and 
opportunities that lie ahead.71 
 
Again, while Bush never directly addressed Vietnam, the inference was that the nation 
would now be “stronger” and “more united,” an interesting suggestion for a public that 
had consistently supported the war effort. 
Limited Commitment, Longstanding Principles 
The third argument employed by the President involved a pragmatic perspective 
on the principles guiding the United States in Iraq.  Bush attributed the U.S. presence in 
the Gulf to longstanding U.S. principles, but modified this claim by reference to the 
limited scope of the U.S. commitment.  By associating these principles with longstanding 
traditions of American exceptionalism, Bush successfully negotiated the fear of casualties 
associated with the war in Vietnam. 
 In his August 8, 1990, address announcing the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi 
Arabia, Bush made the first announcement of four principles that he claimed would guide 
U.S. policy in the region:  1) “the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of 
all Iraqi forces;” 2) restoration of “Kuwait's legitimate government;” 3) “the security and 
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stability of the Persian Gulf;” and 4) protection of “the lives of American citizens 
abroad.”72 
Bush repeated this recitation of principles in several addresses including his 
August 29, 1991, address to forces stationed in the Gulf, his September 11, 1990, address 
to a joint session of Congress, his January 15, 1991, address announcing the 
commencement of allied military action in the Gulf, and his January 29, 1991, State of 
the Union address.  While rather explicit, Bush’s reference to this list as principles 
guiding policy reconfigured his audience’s assumptions regarding the meaning of 
principle.  What Bush labeled as principles seemed more accurately labeled as goals.  In 
choosing such a label, the president configured “principles” as something that could be 
achieved through the accomplishment of U.S. policy.  Arguments founded in the need to 
protect a specific geographic region without references to a broader ideological conflict 
address the central audiences concern with military intervention in the wake of Vietnam.  
U.S. action, in this strategy, is principled and practical. 
 Bush’s rhetorical conception of “principles” did not function in isolation.  As 
Morgenthau argued, the association of the Viet Cong with global communism rendered 
the Vietnam War part of a broader moral crusade during the Cold war, making it more 
difficult for the United States to disentangle itself from that war.  To overcome the 
public’s association of military intervention with failed ideological crusades, Bush looked 
to longer-standing models of public discourse.  Bush analogized Iraq to Germany, circa 
World War II.  Although previous rhetorical analysis has drawn attention to these 
parallels, the focus has differed.  Kathleen M. German noted Bush’s use of directive 
language to overcome the collective memory of Vietnam was such that the mission in the 
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Gulf harkened to a divinely inspired action.73  Stuckey noted that Bush relied upon the 
Munich analogy to bolster his own claims for the immediate cessation of aggression lest 
that aggression spiral into other regional violence directed at Saudi Arabia.74  Kathleen 
German also found connections between the rhetoric used to justify the Gulf War and the 
rhetoric of World War II.75   This echoed the work of the Army Was College’s Jeffrey 
Record.  Record offered an explanation for the dominance of such analogies, arguing that 
in public discourse about military action two dominant analogies have emerged.  In order 
to justify military action, policymakers analogize the potential failure to act to the allied 
failure to prevent Hitler’s expansion beyond Munich.  The failure to immediately 
confront and oppose Nazi aggression, from this perspective, made the Second World War 
inevitable, a mistake that the U.S. should never repeat.76 
Bush owed his use of that rationale to its effective contrast with the equally 
enduring rhetorical legacy of the American war in Vietnam.  That purpose, in fact, 
seemed such an apparent part of Bush’s rhetoric that the nature of that implicit contrast is 
an argument unto itself.  Bush used the World War II analogies not because they were 
successful in their own right but because they tempered the more recent American 
memories of the war in Vietnam.  Although German suggested this success could be 
owed to the sense of divine mission, in the realist sense, such pronouncements alone 
would not suffice.  Comparisons to the Germans and even other less civilized, albeit 
vaguely defined forces now armed with modern weaponry, suggested that even the 
horrors of the past were now a greater threat than ever, surely representing a realist threat 
to the existing balance of power. 
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By explicitly contrasting the military effort in the Persian Gulf to World War II, 
Bush drew attention away from the Vietnam analogy.  Bush began using such a 
comparison on August 8 upon announcing troop deployments to the region: 
Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor, Iraq’s tanks stormed 
in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours.  With more than 
100,000 troops, along with tanks, artillery, and surface-to-surface missiles, Iraq 
now occupies Kuwait.  This aggression came just hours after Saddam Hussein 
specifically assured numerous countries in the area that there would be no 
invasion.  There is no justification whatsoever for this outrageous and brutal act of 
aggression.77 
 
Bush’s references to Iraq suggested that the invasion of Kuwait was the product of 
another, darker time, out of sync with the world emerging from the Cold War.  Whether 
this time was the early 20th century up to World War II or even some time before that 
was irrelevant as any of those periods served the argument.  Just as Bush contrasted the 
forces in the Gulf with their counterparts in Vietnam, here he is further contrasting the 
situation such that analogies to Vietnam are even less appropriate as the situation is more 
analogous to wars that had greater public support. 
What was more important was that this was a far more easily understood threat 
than the complicated enemy of Vietnam.  Iraq, the savage, sovereign state marked a 
return to traditional forms of intrastate opposition: 
Iraq’s unprovoked aggression is a throwback to another era, a dark relic from a 
dark time.  It has plundered Kuwait.  It has terrorized innocent civilians.  It has 
held even diplomats hostage.  Iraq and its leaders must be held liable for these 
crimes of abuse and destruction.78 
 
More apparently, Bush constructed Iraq as a preeminent threat, such that its uncivilized 
military coupled with the tools of modern warfare made it a significant threat. 
But we must recognize that Iraq may not stop using force to advance its 
ambitions.  Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border 
capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional preparation.79 
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 Earlier drafts of this speech went further in the use of the World War II analogy, 
more specifically in drawing on images of the Nuremberg Trials.  The final draft noted 
that Bush’s address occurred on the “anniversary of the convictions at Nuremberg,” 
indicating that the lessons of that era included names “for these barbarous acts:  “War 
Crimes;”“Crimes Against Peace;” and “Crimes Against Humanity.”  When the President 
was to draw attention to United Nations support for the punishment of war crimes, he 
would claim that: 
The bottom line is this:  Heads of state can be held responsible for crimes against 
world law are liable to punishment.  The stakes are high, the cause is just–and 
here at the U.N.–the authority is real.80 
 
An annotated note from Brent Scowcroft crossed out the aforementioned statement with a 
notation inquiring “Do we really want to highlight this now?”81  The Reagan 
administrations prior had engaged in past efforts to delegitimize the findings of the 
U.N.’s International Court of Justice, as it had ruled against the U.S. concerning the 
mining of Nicaragua’s harbors.  The inclusion of the aforementioned passage may have 
drawn attention that an inconsistency in the recognition of such international jurisdiction. 
 When Bush defined principles as the pragmatic goals of a policy option, he still 
needed to satisfy the audience’s need for moral justification.  Policy rhetors could not 
simply define principles as pragmatic goals, as the audience might associate principles 
with moral justifications.  Instead, rhetors must satisfy expectations befitting the divinely 
inspired state of American exceptionalism.  In lieu of such an offering, rhetors offer an 
antagonist against whom any action must by necessity be just.  That this antagonist is 
more easily understood than the “enemy” faced by the U.S. in Vietnam makes that 
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justification more resonant with those clinging to the Vietnam syndrome as a justification 
for inaction and passivity. 
 Moreover, in the event that his audience was wary of confronting such an 
antagonist, Bush offered assurance as to the limited strategic goals of military operations 
in the Gulf. In this case, the easily identified antagonist was paired with a clearly defined 
mission.  Bush laid out a case suggesting that he had taken every possible precaution for 
the troops, stating that “Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military 
commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible, and with the 
greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied service men and women.”  
Coupling the moral certainty of the past with the proficient assurances of the present 
might not prevent comparisons between Vietnam and the first Persian Gulf War, but it 
did provide a rebuttal to those unfavorable toward raising the comparison. 
 Bush also drew distinctions in terms of the ability of forces to complete the task 
arguing that he was “determined to bring them home as soon as possible.”82  The 
audience could contrast this with the vagueness of President Johnson’s efforts during the 
Vietnam War, as here Bush’s limited mission would facilitate the return of troops.  In this 
regard, the aforementioned personal statements from the troops in his January 16, 1991, 
address on the necessity of confronting Iraq function alongside the arguments concerning 
the return of the troops.  Bush coupled this with a later statement in the 1991 State of the 
Union address that “our forces in the Gulf will not stay there one day longer than is 
necessary to complete their mission.”83  In doing so, he projected an image of returned 
troops from a mission accomplished, and the troops had in turn suggested that the 
mission from which they would return was a worthwhile cause.  This message featured 
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two notable rhetorical dimensions:   the first is the use of time, as they would not stay 
“one day longer,” such that the length of their commitment was not longer than 
necessary, a vague commitment with the ring of brevity.  The second dimension is in the 
notion of “mission” itself, as the troops are carrying out a task that they see as morally 
necessary.  In making these arguments, Bush sought to alleviate the uncertainty regarding 
force deployments to Iraq and the inevitable comparison of similar deployments to 
Vietnam. 
Although new foreign policy concerns dominated the president’s agenda, Vietnam 
continued to color public memory when issues of military deployment are at stake.84  In 
the first Persian Gulf War, President George H.W. Bush could not completely cast aside 
the public and elite perception of the Vietnam War, if only because he was himself likely 
an adherent of that perception.  He did address the concerns of American exceptionalism 
in speaking of the principles that have long guided U.S. foreign policy.  However, Bush 
also reconfigured the meaning of principles, alleviating some of the burdens in 
constructing the war rhetoric.  Principles became the outcome of policy action, enabling 
the president to describe events in such a way as to emphasize their significance to the 
defeat of the United States in the jungles of Southeast Asia.  The president’s ability to 
contrast the Gulf War with the Vietnam War spoke to the lingering impact of that 
conflict.  It also provided an example of how a chief executive might justify military 
action in ways that reassure the public without necessitating the full-bore application of 
more treacherous moral arguments. 
According to Bush, the troops in the Gulf were better or at least possessed of 
more desirable qualities than were their predecessors in Vietnam.  The public strongly 
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supported the war in the Gulf and had good reasons to do so.  Their support, in Bush’s 
vision, might allow the nation to become stronger and more united.  Moreover, he 
referenced “principles” served by the U.S. effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait, but defined 
principles such that they reflected pragmatic as much as moral concerns.  These same 
principles allowed him to define victory narrowly in that conflict, such that, in spite of 
the continued threat posed by Iraq, the U.S. had achieved a decisive victory. 
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CHAPTER V 
TRIUMPH IN THE GULF:   
RHETORICALLY CONSTRUCTING VICTORY IN THE FIRST WAR WITH 
IRAQ 
 
i do not think the prudent one 
hastes to initiate 
a sequence of events which he 
lacks the power to terminate 
Don Marquis, Archy and Mehitabel 
Poem 42 “Prudence” 
 
In the wake of Kuwait’s liberation, President Bush lamented the absence of a 
definitive symbol marking the victory of the U.S.-led military coalition over the forces of 
Saddam Hussein.  As he noted in his diary on February 28, 1991: 
I see on the television that public opinion in Jordan and in the streets of Baghdad 
is that they have won.  It is such a canard, so little, but it’s what concerns me.  It 
hasn’t been a clean end-there is no battleship Missouri surrender. That’s what’s 
missing to make this akin to WWII, to separate Kuwait from Korea and Vietnam.1 
 
According to Bush, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
Robert Gates, Director of Central Intelligence, provided him with some optimism 
regarding the U.S. effort.  Both indicated that the U.S.-led effort was historically unique 
in that forces stopped short of eradicating Hussein’s forces.  Once U.S. forces drove Iraq 
from Kuwait, they allowed Iraq to continue to exist as a sovereign entity, demonstrating 
that the United States “didn’t just want to kill,” preferring instead to be judged kindly by 
history for that quality of mercy.2 
In remarks prior to an April 16, 1991, press conference, Bush announced that the 
U.S. would provide assistance to Iraqi refugees.  In doing so, he took pains to describe 
this relief effort as “an undertaking different in scale and approach” than the military 
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operation intended to remove Hussein from Kuwait.3  Bush alleged that this approach 
was consistent with basic policy toward the region, which included the fact that the U.S. 
was “not going to intervene militarily in Iraq’s internal affairs and risk being drawn into a 
Vietnam-style quagmire.”4 
In this chapter, I offer the argument that Bush defined victory in several ways 
after the Gulf War.  First, before and during the war, Bush’s staff made efforts to 
cautiously avoid reference to broad goals for U.S. military operations in the Gulf, 
particularly avoiding charges that military efforts were geared toward regime change.  
Second, when victory was defined, it was in reference to objectives identified as 
principles guiding U.S. action in the region.  Specifically, these principles defined the 
war in the Gulf as a specific conflict whose goal was the removal of Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait, in spite of the continued regional threat posed by Iraq. 
Third, Bush defended his decision to limit the mission objectives as necessary to 
avoid a Vietnam-like quagmire.  This better enabled him to label the U.S. action as a 
“victory,” in contrast to the “defeat” of American forces in Vietnam.  In doing so, the 
conflict had a distinct beginning and end, such that the president could plausibly argue 
that the U.S. military accomplished its mission in spite of its failure to achieve longer-
term regional stability and to eliminate the continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussein.  
It also played into a more prudential assessment of the U.S. role in the Gulf.  The 
attainment of a stated objective and the definition of that attainment as a victory for the 
U.S. satisfied the realist adherence to limited objectives while simultaneously 
proclaiming that what the U.S. did achieve was consistent with a new and “exceptional” 
role as a protector of the new international order. 
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However, much of Bush’s argument was in large part undermined by the final 
manner in which he characterized victory.  In this fourth theme, Bush relied less on the 
humility that guided his prior addresses, instead emphasizing the totalizing nature of U.S. 
victory, often in contrast to the recollection of others, a definition which may have proven 
costly for Bush’s political future.  Before addressing this strategic contrast in greater 
depth, I will explain how American understandings of “defeat” in Vietnam influenced 
characterizations of victory. 
Overcoming Defeat in Vietnam and Defining Victory in the Gulf War  
If the goal of the Vietnam War was to prevent South Vietnam from falling into 
the hands of the communist North, then the U.S. sustained a defeat.  The question of 
defeat, however, is less significant than the perception of defeat that dominated historical 
understandings of the war.5  In 1998, sociologists Charles C. Moskos and James Burk 
called the Gulf War “a quintessentially postmodern war” as they determined that there 
was no standard “allowing everyone to agree” on whether the United States attained 
victory during the Persian Gulf war.6 
Broader questions relating to regional stability further complicated the issue of 
victory.  One day after the war’s cessation on February 28, 1991, Iraqis in the north and 
south sides of the country rose up against the regime in Baghdad.  Iraqi forces 
subsequently crushed this uprising, resulting in the deaths of 20,000 Iraqi Kurds and the 
creation of 2 million refugees who subsequently attempted to flee into Turkey.7  This 
resulted in Operation Provide Comfort, a U.S. humanitarian intervention that continued 
through December of 1996.8  President Bill Clinton launched a military assault against 
military sites in Iraq in 1996 as well, in response to Iraqi violations of the no-fly zone 
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established during Operation Provide comfort.9  As Alain Gresh of Le Monde 
Diplomatique noted, “the order born of the Gulf War looks more like disorder.”10  
Although Bush’s coalition had expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, his “victory” 
was becoming retrospectively elusive. 
Joel H. Rosenthal argued that realists themselves “were skeptical of the terms 
“victory” and “defeat.”11  Realists believed that the indiscriminate use of force decreased 
the chances that such force would achieve desirable political objectives.  From the realist 
perspective, any opportunity to define a military operation more explicitly in terms of its 
pragmatic execution and outcome might prove beneficial after the debacle in Vietnam. 
Rhetorical critic Kenneth Zagacki identified efforts by presidents Nixon and Ford 
to address the war in Vietnam as a failure.  In Nixon’s address announcing the 1973 Paris 
Peace Accords that effectively ended U.S. combat operations in Vietnam, Zagacki argued 
that Nixon laid the groundwork for scapegoating those who favored a quick abandonment 
of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam.  Nixon did so by referring to an America “that did 
not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies.”12  Nixon’s successor, Gerald 
R. Ford, laid the blame for the Fall of Saigon at the feet of Congress, arguing that 
expenditures had declined in fiscal 1974, and then left it to “the American people to pass 
judgment on who was at fault or where the blame may rest.”13  No less a figure than 
General William Westmoreland, the Commander of the Armed Forces in Vietnam, 
typified an emergent strain of belated justification for the U.S. failure, referring to the 
“no-win” situation U.S. forces had been forced into by their civilian leadership.14 
In contrast to Vietnam, the recognition of victory in the Gulf was relatively 
widespread.  In a 1999 address celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Joint Chiefs of 
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Staff, President Bill Clinton referenced the Gulf War alongside World Wars I and II, the 
Cold War, and the U.S. victory in the Balkans during his own administration as evidence 
of the strength of U.S. military commitments.15  This was but one of several references to 
the Gulf victory that Bush’s 1992 electoral rival made over the course of his two terms in 
office.  While Bush’s rhetorical efforts to define the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
were not uniquely responsible for shaping the public’s perception of that conflict, his 
assurances that victory had in fact occurred and that the Vietnam syndrome had been 
thoroughly defeated were no doubt persuasive claims to a great many Americans.  
Washington Post columnist Mary McGrory, for example, argued that Bush “excised the 
Vietnam syndrome from the country’s psyche.”16  Dov Zacheim, former Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defense during the Reagan administration, pointed to the U.S. victory 
in the Gulf as the final nail in the coffin for the Vietnam syndrome.17  Public sentiment in 
the war’s aftermath seemed to point to a similar sentiment, with Bush enjoying popularity 
unseen since, and exceeding Harry S Truman’s World War II-era polling.18 
The Meanings of Victory in the Gulf 
The Initial Terms of Victory 
Although Bush came to define the war in the Gulf as a specific, limited conflict, 
the goal of which was the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, this definition did differ 
from some earlier tendencies to define the mission objectives in broader terms.  In a 1991 
address, for example, Bush indicated that Iraq’s capacity to sustain war was being 
destroyed as Hussein’s “war machine was crushed.”19 
In a similar vein, speechwriter Mark Davis indicated that the NSC cautioned Bush 
against referring to Hussein as Hitler because of its implication for the objective of 
    
158
military operations.  “The thinking was that if he was another Hitler, then he had to be 
taken out completely, we had to invade Iraq and take over the country,” Davis noted.20 
In another case, Bush’s rhetorical orientation of victory in Iraq also departed from 
the messages constructed by his speechwriters.  In a White House staffing memorandum 
dated February 28, 1991 from National Security advisor Brent Scowcroft to Chriss 
Winston, Scowcroft prominently edited the second draft of a radio address that Bush was 
to deliver to U.S. troops in the Gulf on March 1, 1990.  The original text read as follows: 
And the world was faced with a simple choice:  If Iraq could not or would not 
remove Saddam Hussein from power – then we had to remove power from 
Saddam Hussein.21 
 
The final text featured changes based on Scowcroft’s handwritten suggestions.  
Scowcroft removed the reference to the removal of Hussein from power.  In its place, 
was a newer statement emphasizing a more limited outcome:  “If international law and 
sanctions could not remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, then we had to free Kuwait 
from Saddam Hussein.”22 
 Principled Victory 
David Demarest recalled the President’s concern following the removal of Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait that U.S. military operations in the Gulf not develop any further 
objectives.  “Shooting people while they’re running away is not what this country is 
about,” he recalled Bush saying.  Bush was specifically referencing the military 
interception of looters from Basra after the cessation of major combat activities.  
Demarest believed that this incident had a profound effect on Bush’s assessment of the 
immediate post-war situation: 
It was clear that the Iraqi army was absolutely defeated.  And there were the 
options of “what do we do now?”  The President felt very strongly that we had to 
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stop.  That the coalition would fall apart if we exceeded what was the coalition 
mandate, which was simply kick him out of Kuwait, eliminate his ability to 
threaten his neighbors, and eliminate his ability to use weapons of mass 
destruction.  So it wasn’t to decapitate the government.23 
 
In order for Bush’s argument to retain any sense of historical merit, he had to define the 
terms of victory narrowly so that the public could embrace his conception of victory.  In 
the narrowest of terms, his earliest pronouncement as to the terms of victory came in the 
four principles mentioned in his August 8, 1990, address:  the withdrawal of Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait’s sovereign government to power; a commitment 
to regional stability and the protection of Americans abroad.  By war’s end, Bush relied 
on these principles as the standard for determining the success of the U.S. mission in the 
Gulf. 
These principles, however, did not function in isolation.  The Administration 
combined these principles with a broader effort to couch victory in more limited terms, 
such that that U.S. victory in the Gulf offered no guarantee of international peace.  For 
Bush, the Gulf War became a limited conflict that did not necessarily offer a prediction of 
the world that was to come:   
We’ve learned the hard lessons of history.  The victory over Iraq was not waged 
as “a war to end all wars.”  Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of 
perpetual peace.24 
 
Bush’s qualification of the nature of the United States victory was consistent with his 
earlier portrayal of the war as a historically situated, limited conflict.  However, 
maintaining that victory required a consistent rhetorical effort on his part to define 
narrowly the terms of victory in the Gulf War. 
In a March 1 press conference, Bush distinguished between the war in Persian 
Gulf and efforts “securing the victory that our forces have achieved.25  On March 4, in 
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comments before veterans’ organizations, Bush reiterated that the U.S. had “kicked the 
Vietnam syndrome” in the Gulf, arguing that the return of U.S. forces from that region 
might create greater appreciation for the role of Vietnam veterans.26  In this same speech, 
Bush went further, somehow reconciling celebration of victory in the Gulf with national 
humility. 
And so, as we rejoice in our victory, I think we can also rejoice in the fact that we 
are a humble nation – that we have pride, of course, in what took place, but we are 
not gloating. We are not trying to rub it in. What we stood for was a principle.27 
 
America, in Bush’s rhetoric, was not a braggart and arguably retained some degree of 
humility, albeit in this case no longer cautioned by the “Vietnam” syndrome.  Instead, 
America derived her sense of national humility from her essential goodness, rather than 
the lingering memories of defeat in the jungles of Southeast Asia.  This newfound sense 
of purpose continued when, in his March 6, 1991, address to a joint session of Congress 
on the conflict’s cessation, Bush immediately laid to rest any notion that U.S. hegemony 
alone would result in permanent peace and security.  For these problems, he argued, 
“there is no single solution, no solely American answer.”28  Instead, he argued that 
America would “work tirelessly as a catalyst for positive change.”29 
 Any regional change would occur only with the assistance of the international 
community.  Bush’s reference to principled victory also indicated that in adhering to 
these principles, the United States remained committed to the international consensus that 
guided action in the Gulf.  As he noted in his April 16, 1991, press conference, “I think I 
would call to the attention of the critics what the objectives were, what the United 
Nations resolutions called for.  And I think that they were admirably completed.”30 
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Bush’s defense of the U.S. decision to end the conflict for reasons of principle 
was not limited to public statements.  One such rhetorical effort was in the publication of 
A World Transformed, Bush’s memoir, written with his National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft, detailed his handling of foreign policy issues over the course of his 
administration.  Lawrence Freedman of Kings College in London indicated that Bush’s 
book, and its coincidental release alongside the political ascendancy of George W. Bush, 
marked “a retrospective endorsement of his presidency.”31  Another review by Thomas 
A. Schwartz of Vanderbilt University called the book “a compelling defense of the 
administration’s policy, including leaving Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.”32  Harvey 
Sicherman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a former member of Secretary of 
State James Baker III’s policy staff noted that the book “does contain evidence for a more 
convincing argument of what happened and why.”33 
The significance of the title should not be discounted.  Historian Gaddis Smith 
indicated that the title of A World Transformed recalled an earlier book by Henry 
Kissinger entitled A World Restored.34  Other authors spoke of the inordinate attention 
devoted in the text to the Gulf War at the expense of other events, suggesting a hierarchy 
of significance with the Gulf War victory ranking alongside the management of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse and the management of relations with China in the wake of the 
Tiananmen Square massacre.35 
 In A World Transformed, Bush indicated that even before he was aware of his 
options for dealing with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he “did know for sure that the 
aggression had to be stopped and Kuwait’s sovereignty restored.”36  Scowcroft, 
Morgenthau’s former student, was more immediately explicit in laying out military 
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objectives of U.S. action in Operation Desert Storm as he noted that foremost “among 
those was to reduce the Iraqi military machine as much as possible” and “to reduce the 
threat Saddam posed to his neighbors.”37 
Avoiding the Quagmire 
Bush at this point turned to terminology related to futility and paralleling the 
language of opponents of the Vietnam War in justifying his limited objectives.  If the 
U.S. went beyond the authority of Security Council resolutions, he argued that forces 
would be led into a “fruitless” search for a “securely entrenched dictator.”38  They would 
be “condemned” to an “unwinnable urban guerilla war.”39  Instead, Bush argued that “the 
American people want their sons and daughters to come home, and they’re going to come 
home,” as the mission had been accomplished.  Any efforts beyond the removal of Iraq 
from Kuwait constituted, like assisting war refugees, posed “only little difficulty” for 
U.S. forces.40 
In describing the initial events of Desert Storm in A World Transformed Bush re-
articulated the explicit objectives of his policy to “end the aggression, knock Iraq’s forces 
out of Kuwait, and restore Kuwait’s leaders.”41  However, the consequences of failing to 
adhere to these objectives were now rendered explicitly as fears that going further and 
occupying Iraq “would instantly shatter our coalition, turning the whole Arab world 
against us” and transform “a broken tyrant into a latter-day Arab hero.”42 
In spite of what seemed like certainty in depicting U.S. objectives against Iraq, 
Bush and Scowcroft lamented the implications of the war’s cessation:   the failure to 
destroy the Republican Guard, the unsuccessful uprising of various minority populations 
in the region, and the continuing regional threat posed by Hussein.  Their response to 
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these issues, however, extended back to their aforementioned adherence to principle.  In 
this case, however, that principle was defined such that the implications of violating it 
were potentially catastrophic: 
Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, 
would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in mid-stream, 
engaging in “mission creep” and would have incurred incalculable human and 
political costs.43 
 
Bush now used American casualty aversion as an argument against expanded regional 
involvement in the Persian Gulf. Coupled with his earlier use of terms related to mission 
futility, Bush described the Gulf War and its outcome as the antithesis of the war in 
Vietnam.  Going beyond the objectives laid out in the U.N. Security Council would have 
led to a potentially futile quagmire not unlike the war in Vietnam, versus the actual U.S. 
mission objective in simply removing Hussein from Kuwait and restoring the leaders of 
Kuwait. 
 Bush went further in his use of the Vietnam analogy.  While the previous chapter 
argued that Bush compared the Gulf War favorably to the U.S. experience in Vietnam, in 
the aftermath of the war, Bush compared the mission completed by the U.S. favorably to 
the Vietnam-like quagmire that would have ensued if the U.S. had attempted to depose 
Hussein. 
Bold Victory 
Bush largely defined the nature of that catalyst in relation to the defeat of the 
Vietnam syndrome.  During his commencement address at the University of Michigan on 
May 4, 1991, in justifying Operation Provide Comfort and other humanitarian efforts in 
the wake of the U.S. “victory” in the Gulf, Bush argued that the nature of that victory had 
emboldened Americans:
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Our successes have banished the Vietnam era phantoms of doubt and distrust. 
And in my recent travels around the country, I have felt an idealism that we 
Americans supposedly had lost.  People have faith in the future, and they ask what 
next, and they ask, “How can I help?”  We have rediscovered the power of the 
idea that toppled the Berlin Wall and led a world to strike back at Saddam 
Hussein.44 
 
The end of post-Vietnam pessimism was so thoroughly defeated by Bush’s foreign policy 
successes, among which he explicitly cites the U.S. opposition to the invasion of Iraq, 
that Americans now support more active humanitarian intervention. 
 In his postwar address to a joint session of Congress, Bush first introduced the 
suggestion that his foreign policy agenda could reflect his domestic agenda.  The limited 
conflict against Iraq provided a model for domestic efficiency.  As he noted of the war 
“there were clear-cut objectives” and “an overriding imperative to achieve results” which 
can be applied “the way we meet challenges here at home.”45 
Bush clearly relied upon the assumption that his own audience perceived the U.S. 
action in the Gulf as a victory for the United States, such that victory in the foreign policy 
venue could be replicated in domestic policy.  Although Bush failed to elaborate 
thoroughly on his new use of Iraq as an analogue for domestic efficiency, the failure of 
this argument owed less to the failure of his audience to perceive victory in the Gulf than 
on Bush’s inability to articulate clearly a domestic policy vision.46 
 Bush’s rhetorical reflections on the Gulf War, in the immediate aftermath of that 
conflict, reflected a combination of humility and jubilation.  In comments on a CBS 
television salute to the returning forces, Bush was more decisive and less humble in his 
interpretation: 
You know, it’s just a few short weeks ago the fighting in the Persian Gulf ended 
and complete victory for the coalition forces. . . You know, America rediscovered 
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itself during Desert Storm.  First-rate military leaders executed a sound battle plan 
and delivered a swift victory.47 
 
Initially, he acknowledged the shortcomings of the United States action to remove Iraq 
from Kuwait, indicating that for the forces opposing Iraqi aggression, some work 
remained undone.  Bush’s address in acceptance of the Republican nomination for the 
Presidency in 1992 took a similar tone concerning the Persian Gulf War.  Referring to 
remaining security threats in the absence of the Soviet Union, he noted that Saddam 
Hussein represented such a threat: 
And we saw that when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.  The Mideast might 
have become a nuclear powderkeg, our energy supplies held hostage.  So we did 
what was right, and what was necessary.  We destroyed a threat, freed a people, 
and locked a tyrant in the prison of his own country.48 
 
In spite of his earlier regrets regarding the cessation of hostilities, here before a 
principally partisan crowd, Bush reconstructed the conflict.  Bush’s reference to the 
nuclear “powderkeg” intensified the impact of Bush’s argument on “energy supplies held 
hostage.”  This connotation, even if unintentional, retrospectively altered the stakes of 
U.S. participation in efforts to remove Iraq from Kuwait. The U.S. victory in the Gulf 
was no longer just decisive, but eliminated a threat. 
The suggestion that the U.S. had eliminated this threat, however, was short-lived, 
as President George W. Bush rhetorically renewed the threat posed by Iraq in his 2003 
State of the Union address.49  Nonetheless, Bush had initiated a sustained effort to 
preserve his foreign policy legacy by retrospectively limiting U.S. objectives in the first 
Gulf War.  This should not suggest that this historical assessment was intentionally 
deceptive.  Instead, it posits that this assessment played a significant role in maintaining 
the perception among the electorate that what occurred during Operation Desert Storm 
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was a distinct victory for U.S. forces, in contrast to the failure that the U.S. faced in 
Vietnam. 
By initially lessening the expectations of his audience as to the nature of the 
victory in the Gulf, Bush retrospectively emphasized the end result of the U.S. action as a 
victory in spite of continued hostility in the region.  His arguments relied upon a 
conception of U.S. victory such that it provided a model for U.S. domestic policy and 
justified U.S. humanitarian intervention as he could argue that Americans were 
emboldened by the U.S. victory.  The impact of this rhetoric should not be 
underestimated.  As historian Michael Howard noted in reviewing A World Transformed, 
“In retrospect, 1989-91 now seems as briefly euphoric as 1944-45.”50 
The public euphoria following the Gulf War may have also resulted perhaps the 
most prominent political miscalculation of the Bush White House.  While some in the 
White House, notably Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Communications Director David 
Demarest, and Gregg Petersmyer of the Points of Life Foundation, feared that the 
political implications of the Gulf victory could prove ephemeral, others, notably Chief of 
Staff John Sununu, saw electoral victory in 1992 as predetermined by the outcome of the 
Gulf War.51  Demarest described the longer-term consequences of that outcome for 
Bush’s political legacy in starker terms, noting that it created doubt among some 
segments of the population who would go on to argue, “Bush should have gone up there 
and finished the job.”52  As Bush ran on a platform that prominently dealt with the war, 
the questions spurred by his decision to limit the conflict seemed to run contrary to his 
increasingly bold rhetoric in describing the war’s outcome.  Bush’s bold proclamations of 
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victory gave way, once more to a justification of his war aims based on principle, limiting 
the conflict to one with a clearly defined terminal outcome. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
LEARNING FROM THE PAST:  FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, AND 
CONCLUSION 
 
We will consult.  But let there be no misunderstanding:  If Saddam Hussein does 
not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we 
will lead a coalition to disarm him. 
President George Walker Bush 
“Address before Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union” 
January 28, 2003 
 
 
Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on 
the seas and sands.  We know why we’re there:  We are Americans, part of 
something larger than ourselves.  For two centuries, we’ve done the hard work of 
freedom.  And tonight, we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and 
humanity. 
President George Herbert Walker Bush 
“Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union” 
January 29, 1991 
 
What is required of the circumspect observer who consults history as a teacher for 
action, then, is a sharp distinction between what is typical and what is unique in 
two historic situations.  If the typical elements coincide and are relevant to the 
issue at hand, the lesson of the past can indeed be applied to the present. 
Hans J. Morgenthau, 1969 
 
 
In President George H.W. Bush’s1 rhetoric on the first Persian Gulf War, he 
reconciled two seemingly opposing concepts:   realism, the theory of international 
relations espoused by figures like Han Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry 
Kissinger, and American exceptionalism, the dominant theme in the grand narrative of 
American foreign policy.  He was not the first president to do so, as even iconic figures 
like Reagan and Kennedy were similarly constrained, and they similarly made use of 
idealistic and pragmatic arguments. 2  However, in responding to the rhetorical 
    
175
constraints imposed by these two concepts, GHW Bush fashioned a rhetorical defense of 
his policy in militarily opposing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that made not only explicit 
public use of both, but did so in a way that challenged assumptions about both.  He 
advocated multilateral action and did not hesitate to evoke memories of Vietnam if only 
implicitly to compare his own military effort favorably to that perceived historical failure.  
GHW Bush used advocacy that seemed to embrace publicly calculated realist concerns 
regarding the national interest while still embracing the traditional notion that America 
should embrace a policy guided by its own morally exceptional nature. 
In this, the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I will address the following 
issues.  First, I briefly summarize the findings of this study.  Second, I will identify some 
limitations of this research.  Third, I will identify some implications from this research 
for our understandings of presidential rhetoric.  Finally, I will conclude with a 
comparison of two notable State of the Union Addresses concerning Iraq, the first from 
George H.W. Bush in 1991, and the second from his son George W. Bush in 2003, to 
demonstrate how the rhetoric of the two Persian Gulf War has differed, and why that 
difference matters. 
Findings, Limitations, and Rhetorical Implications 
This dissertation began with a relatively simple inquiry.  Why did GHW Bush, a 
president who both abhorred rhetoric, and whose rhetoric was largely abhorred by others, 
receive praise for his rhetoric during the first U.S. war in the Persian Gulf?  In this 
dissertation, I argued that President GHW Bush relied on three particular arguments to 
facilitate a U.S. military victory during the1991 Persian Gulf War. 
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First, he promoted U.N. diplomacy as a subsidiary of U.S. foreign policy, where 
United States interests would not be constrained.  Bush described the U.N. of the post-
Cold War era as forever changed, no longer functioning as the politically constrained, 
impotent forum derided by the realists.  Instead, it was renewed with its original sense of 
purpose and better able to address the needs of the U.S. and world communities in the 
absence of bilateral Cold War hostility. 
Second, GHW Bush compared and contrasted U.S. action in the Gulf to the 
Vietnam War such that the military action in Iraq seemed morally urgent and explicitly 
competent, avoiding a repeat of the American experience in Vietnam.  The troops were 
better than their Vietnam era predecessors, they did not face the same division that had 
torn the country apart during Vietnam, and they faced a mission that was better defined 
with a clear end in sight.  GHW Bush portrayed the conflict as a product of longstanding 
American principles, while simultaneously emphasizing the modest strategic goals and 
minimal risk incurred by U.S. involvement. 
Third, GHW Bush depicted the conflict as a discrete foreign policy event in which 
he narrowly defined victory as the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In spite of the 
continued regional threat posed by Iraq and the U.S. failure to remove that threat, the war 
became a decisive foreign policy accomplishment. 
These arguments not only offered a compelling case for the U.S. war against Iraq, 
but they also defied the standard categories describing the conduct of U.S. foreign policy 
and the rhetoric used in its justification.  GHW Bush relied on public arguments that 
combined a realist orientation with the moralizing rhetoric of American exceptionalism, 
in spite of the fact that policymakers rarely offered realism in public defense of policy.  
    
177
GHW Bush elevated the place of realism in public argument to a shared pedestal 
alongside American exceptionalism. 
There were some identifiable limitations on this study.  The first has to do with 
the limited focus on the events leading up to and immediately following Operations 
Desert Storm and Shield.  GHW Bush had other notable foreign policy actions, including 
the U.S. invasion of Panama, the effort to restore order in Somalia under the auspices of 
Operation Restore Hope, and protection of refugees in Iraq under the auspices of 
Operation Provide Comfort.  Determining how the president employed realist public 
advocacy, if at all, during other notable military operations might have permitted a more 
definitive understanding of realism in public policy discourse. 
A second limitation concerns the use of realism in public policy.  Although 
Scowcroft was a student of Kissinger, and the occasional policymaker has voiced praise 
for Morgenthau and realist theory, very rarely will policymakers publicly proclaim their 
adherence to realist doctrine as doing so might heighten scrutiny of their actions, or even 
be perceived as a limitation on the ability to act based upon the unique circumstances of a 
given case.  While realism was a particularly fitting rhetorical vision that could be 
employed for the circumstances identified in prior chapters, whether it will retain a place 
of significance alongside American exceptionalism remains to be seen.  While there is a 
good reason to associate GHW Bush’s own use of what he refers to as prudence with 
realism, that association is largely conjecture. 
A third limitation is in the use of realism as a singular concept.  Realists might 
argue that realism is not a monolithic construct.  To the contrary, the grand narrative of 
realist international relations has a number of subtle variations depending upon the teller 
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of that narrative.  Realists included herein are not necessarily shoehorned into such a 
categorization, but among them, there exist differences of opinion.  Kissinger was, after 
all, one of the architects of American policy in Vietnam under Nixon, and the cessation 
of active military involvement did not occur until Nixon’s second term. 
There were also implications from the study concerning GHW Bush’s use of 
multilateralism.  While others have covered GHW Bush’s rhetoric on the Gulf War,3 
none explained his use of the U.N. as a legitimizing rhetorical force, and particularly how 
these arguments operated in the wake of the realist hesitation to act multilaterally.  GHW 
Bush succeeded not only because the U.N. was a legitimizing agent, but also because it 
bestowed legitimacy upon that organization. 
Although both Stuckey and German have addressed comparisons between the first 
War in the Persian Gulf and the Vietnam War, here I explained the effectiveness in light 
of both implicit and explicit comparisons to the time, the situation and to the troops.  
GHW Bush continued to contrast the situations because it seemed to him to overcome the 
memories of that war, although those memories still linger.  While Dionisopoulos and 
Goldzwig have argued that attempts to revise the “orthodox” history of “defeat” in 
Vietnam have failed,4 Zagacki and McMahon have independently identified rhetorical 
efforts to address the U.S. defeat.5  In this study, however, I have identified the Vietnam 
war as a useful rhetorical analogue for mission success.  Now, rather than solely 
functioning as a caution against foreign policy action, implicitly comparing a military 
action against the Vietnam War might be used to differentiate that action as superior.  
The more a rhetor can successfully and favorably differentiate their particular situation 
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from the American experience in Vietnam, the more likely he or she is to explicitly 
present such a case to the people. 
This study is also useful in that it identifies realism as both a conceptual constraint 
and as a rhetorical force.  Robert Alexander Kraig has one of the few rhetorical works to 
explicitly deal with realism and its specific implications for presidential rhetoric.  
Realism is a traditionally technical rhetoric rather than a public one.  Here, however, I 
demonstrated how realism functioned in concert with more favored forms of public 
policy discourse.  When tempered by American exceptionalism, realist arguments may 
seem more palatable to a public basking in the post-Cold War moment and better 
prepared for its cold, calculative rationality in light of the American experience in 
Vietnam. 
GHW Bush’s rhetoric might have better served the U.S. during the second war in 
the Gulf.  As I will argue below, the Presidents Bush differed considerably in their 
approaches to U.S. policy in the Gulf.   These differences have not favored the current 
administration.  While the Gulf War of 1991 differed considerably from that of the 21st 
century, the younger Bush would seem best served by adhering to some of his father’s 
lessons.  In particular, GHW Bush’s reliance on multilateral alliances for policy 
legitimation and his comparison to Vietnam in order to demonstrate the strength of his 
planning seem to provide some direction for a president seeking to initiate and conduct a 
conflict deemed successful by the public.  The lesson itself never seemed to materialize 
in the rhetoric of GW Bush. 
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The Presidents Bush, the U.S. and the Persian Gulf 
Although the adversarial relationship between the United States and the Baathist 
regime of Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein was the concern of three presidential 
administrations, U.S. efforts to combat militarily the regime have become most firmly 
associated with the Presidents George Herbert Walker Bush and his son, George Walker 
Bush.  Even so, the rhetorical means by which the two Bush administrations advocated 
and defended their foreign policy actions differed considerably.  Surprisingly, current 
policy seemed to lack the rhetorical posture of the initial Gulf War discourse, a 
development that has proven, to at least some minute degree, problematic. 
According to Edward C. Luck, when then Governor GW Bush was asked in 2000 
about how other nations looked at the United States, he responded in a way that seemed 
to reflect his father’s disposition on diplomacy and foreign policy.  He remarked, “if 
we’re an arrogant nation, they’ll resent us . . . Our nation stands alone right now in the 
world in terms of power.  And that’s why we’ve got to be humble and yet project strength 
in a way that promotes freedom.”6  But the younger Bush did not embrace this vision for 
long. 
As argued in prior chapters, GHW Bush’s rhetoric on U.S. involvement in the 
Persian Gulf to repel the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait involved a calculated combination of 
realist argument within the prior rhetorical conventions of American exceptionalism.  On 
January 20, 2004, George Walker Bush, 43rd President of the United States, delivered his 
fourth State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress.  Although a number of 
issues were touched upon in that address, none drew greater attention than the continued 
U.S.-led military occupation of Iraq.7  The first major public address advocating the 
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invasion preceding that occupation had come a year earlier, in GW Bush’s 2003 State of 
the Union address. 
By the end of 2003, U.S.-led military forces had overthrown the Iraqi regime of 
dictator Saddam Hussein, and the GW Bush administration had since committed to the 
reconstruction of that Persian Gulf nation, which included efforts to assist in the 
establishment of a Western-style democracy.8  Although the invasion of Iraq and the 
subsequent capture of Hussein and other members of his regime received strong support 
from a significant segment of the American public,9 the second major U.S. military 
intervention in the Persian Gulf was not without difficulty for the second President Bush. 
Although the circumstances differed considerably, some critics and advocates of 
the present administration’s Iraq policy could not avoid comparing the 1991 and 2003 
military campaigns.10  Unlike the 2003 campaign, reaction to George H. W. Bush’s Iraq 
policy differed in two ways from reaction to his son’s efforts.  First, Operation Desert 
Storm and its earlier incarnation as Operation Desert Shield had enjoyed relative 
international consensus on the need to act in the Gulf.11  Second, in spite of some early 
partisan legislative opposition to increased U.S. engagement in the Gulf,12 President 
GHW Bush received strong and persistent domestic support for U.S. efforts in the region 
before and during the first war against Iraq.13 
In fairness to the present administration, a comparison of the literature on the first 
Gulf War and the current war revealed one principal difference that existed between the 
rationales and justifications for the two Iraqi conflicts.  Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm had significantly more limited objectives than Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
The stated and explicit objective of the coalition forces during the initial Desert Shield 
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phase of the first Gulf War was a defense of Saudi territory from a potential Iraqi 
incursion after Iraq’s successful occupation of Kuwait.  When Desert Shield gave way to 
Desert Storm, the U.S. ultimately shifted to the forced withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from 
Kuwaiti territory.  Operation Iraqi Freedom differed considerably in that it involved an 
implicitly offensive posture whose goal, in the words of reporter Todd Purdum, was “not 
just to repulse Saddam’s invasion of a small neighboring country but to crush him on his 
own turf.”14 
Operation Desert Storm was never explicitly concerned with directly eliminating 
the sovereign authority of Hussein regime, a fact that some observers have partially 
attributed to the GHW Bush administration’s desire to maintain the international coalition 
that facilitated U.S. efforts to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  As argued in Chapter I, 
exceeding that perceived international mandate for action in the Gulf would have 
disrupted that alliance, a fact not lost on the administration.15 
The difficulty in achieving international consensus reflects what comparative 
political scholar Richard Rose identifies as the era of the “Postmodern President.”16  Rose 
characterized the “Postmodern Presidency,” as an institution influenced by the increasing 
interdependence between the United States and the international community, an 
interdependence facilitated to a great degree by the president’s relative autonomy in 
shaping American foreign policy.  Rose suggests that the president particularly utilizes its 
symbolic dominance in foreign policy to shape the public’s perception on international 
events.17  Just as literature on the presidency has determined that the president is a 
success “if he can influence Washington and public opinion,” success in an 
interdependent world “requires that foreign influences are consistent with his policy 
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choices.”18  As Rose and colleague Robert J. Thompson noted of President GHW Bush in 
an article written in the midst of his administration, the challenge facing GHW Bush was 
“to act internationally in situations in which other nations have significant influence 
too.”19 
GHW Bush’s rhetorical success on the Persian Gulf conflict stands in marked 
contrast to the popular conception of his own rhetorical prowess.  Andrew Furgeson, a 
GHW Bush speechwriter, said that Bush “thought of speeches as superficial P.R. 
events.”20  However, in spite of his rhetorical reluctance, GHW Bush “was cognizant of 
the impact of a presidential statement and disciplined about what he said,” particularly 
regarding his rhetoric on the Gulf War where he “crafted his statements carefully, fully 
aware that his words reverberated both domestically and abroad.”21  This distinction 
between father and son is apparent in their rhetoric regarding their respective Gulf 
conflicts.  In this case, I will compare the Gulf War rhetoric in the 1991 and 2003 State of 
the Union addresses. 
Comparing the 1991 and the 2003 State of the Union Addresses 
The 1991 State of the Union Address 
GHW Bush owed his use of the United Nations as a legitimizing venue in part to 
the new situation that the organization found itself in during the post-Cold War period.  
As political scientist Donald J. Puchala noted: 
the Bush administration’s focus on the United Nations in the Gulf crisis can be 
understood as the pragmatic targeting of a diplomatic venue where effective 
problem solving could be expected to take place.22 
 
Bush’s rhetoric demonstrates a keen awareness of the role of the U.N. in a post-Cold War 
order, making the new era a culmination of the first.  The Cold War’s end has ushered in 
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a new era deprived of the threats borne of bilateral hegemonic hostility.  The new world 
order was the product of that era, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was its first test: 
What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea—a new world 
order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the 
universal aspirations of mankind:  peace and security, freedom, and the rule of 
law.  Such is a world worthy of our struggle, and worthy of our children’s 
future.23 
 
GHW Bush further implied that the world and the United Nations were one and the same, 
a suggestion that might have proven more troubling to American policymakers at the 
Cold War’s height.  “The world has answered Saddam’s invasion with 12 United Nations 
resolutions, starting with a demand for Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal, 
and backed up by forces from 28 countries of 6 continents,” he said. “With few 
exceptions, the world now stands as one.”24 
 Even while advocating this action, GHW Bush did not abandon the American 
exceptionalist themes that characterized most foreign policy rhetoric.  He embraced them, 
and pointed to their role in the current state of the world. 
The conviction and courage we see in the Persian Gulf today is simply the 
American character in action.  The indomitable spirit that is contributing to this 
victory for world peace and justice is the same spirit that gives us the power and 
the potential to meet our toughest challenges at home.  We are resolute and 
resourceful.  If we can selflessly confront the evil for the sake of good in a land so 
far away, then surely we can make this land all that it should be.  If anyone tells 
you that America’s best days are behind her, they’re looking the wrong way.25 
 
GHW Bush identified America as great, which he asserts to be a self-evident proposal.  
This greatness, identifiable in the Gulf, is translatable to the domestic front.  Like 
Eisenhower before him, he seemed to assert that America was great because she was 
good. 
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 The goodness of the U.S. was not the only feature on display in the Gulf.  With 
the Cold War over, the Gulf War provided the perfect venue for U.N. leadership. 
The courage and success of the RAF pilots, of the Kuwaiti, Saudi, French, the 
Canadians, the Italians, the pilots of Qatar and Bahrain—all are proof that for the 
first time since World War II, the international community is united.  The 
leadership of the United Nations, once only a hoped-for ideal, is now confirming 
its founders’ vision.26 
 
The U.N, in GHW Bush’s speech, only now had the opportunity to live up the promise of 
its founding.  Unlike the institution that became a venue for anti-Western hostility in the 
popular imagination, in the post-Cold War era, the U.N. was prepared for the challenges 
of that era. 
The 2003 State of the Union Address 
Unlike his father, George W. Bush paid little explicit heed to the role of the 
international community in the wake of the Gulf War.  Instead, he relied upon the 
experiences of his father in the first Gulf War with reference to the significance of the 
international coalition that removed Iraq from Kuwait, but the younger GW Bush no 
longer referred to the United Nations as the essential forum in which the U.S. aligned 
such a coalition.  GW Bush then coupled this dissociation with a historical perspective 
oriented in the unique challenges of the post 9/11 world and his execution of the “war on 
terror,” based on the success of American forces in succesfully ending the rule of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan.  GW Bush’s rhetorical employment of the tragedy that occurred 
during his administration was highly relevant and resonant to his audience.  But the 
younger Bush was more predisposed to a more narrow reading of the international 
situation, versus his father whose rhetoric acknowledged the role of past conflicts and 
foreign policy actions that led to the post-Cold War scene.  For GW Bush, the history of 
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American foreign policy after the collapse of the Soviet Union was less relevant than 
what occurred on and after September 11, 2001. 
The 2003 State of the Union address, for example, contains six references to the 
terms “attack” or “attacks,” versus only one such reference in the 1991 address in which 
reference is made to the ability to“defend against ballistic missile attacks aimed at 
innocent civilians.”27 GW Bush described the contemporary world in more dangerous 
terms than the one confronted by his father, whose reference to attacks is more 
speculative and less premised in reality that might be recognizable to the audience.  GW 
Bush also situates the threat posed by non-state terrorism in terms more familiar to that 
audience: 
Throughout the 20th century, small groups of men seized control of great nations, 
built armies and arsenals, and set out to dominate the weak and intimidate the 
world.  In each case, their ambitions of cruelty and murder had no limit.  In each 
case, the ambitions of Hitlerism, militarism, and communism were defeated by 
the will of free peoples, by the strength of great alliances, and by the might of the 
United States of America.28 
 
Although the explicit reference is to “outlaw regimes” who pose “the gravest danger in 
the war on terror,” the suggestion is that terrorism is philosophically consistent with 
ideologies previously defeated by the U.S.  The implicit suggestion is that the application 
of force that has succeeded in the past can again defeat America’s newest ideological 
adversary. 
 While much of his father’s rhetoric occasionally demonstrated the elder Bush’s 
diplomatic experience, GW Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address seemed to depict the 
president as a caricature of masculinized Texas bravado.  After describing U.S. success in 
the battle against Al-Qaeda through the capture and arrest of various Al-Qaeda 
operatives, he bragged of others not captured, saying “Let’s put it this way—they are no 
    
187
longer a problem to the United States and our friends and allies.”  When describing the 
U.S. pursuit of terrorists, he claimed, “One by one, the terrorists are learning the meaning 
of American justice.”29 
 Although critics of the war might anticipate otherwise, GW Bush did not 
demonstrate complete disdain for his father’s diplomatic predispositions.  In truth, he 
rhetorically embraced some of those predispositions, even when his execution of those 
policies did not.  As his father used the United Nations as a vehicle for attaining 
legitimacy for U.S. action, GW Bush referenced a vague coalition to dismiss the 
suggestions of his own unilateralism. 
We are working closely with other nations to prevent further attacks.  America 
and coalition countries have uncovered and stopped terrorist conspiracies 
targeting the American embassy in Yemen, the American embassy in Singapore, a 
Saudi military base, ships in the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Gibraltar.30 
 
He ambiguously referred to these other nations simply as “coalition countries” since 
doing more might require troubling specificity.  Aside from the vague aformentioned 
reference, GW Bush referred only two other times to any “coalition.”  The first time GW 
Bush referred to a “coalition” occurred when he offered it as a coercive alternative to the 
United Nations should they fail to take action against Iraq (“we will lead a coalition to 
disarm him”).31  The second such reference occurred in reference to “coalition partners” 
in Afghanistan. 
 GW Bush abandoned the New World Order of the post-Cold War era in favor of a 
post 9/11 scene where the United Nations legitimacy was now in question.  His father 
suggested that U.S. action in the Persian Gulf was the decisive act of a world enjoying the 
fruits of the Cold War’s end.  The United Nations, the object of conservative scorn from 
the time of its inception, had a new purpose under which it could fulfill its ideals.  George 
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H.W. Bush, the consummate realist, recast the United Nations as a Hobbesian vehicle for 
maintaining the international rule of law.  GW Bush, on the other hand, returned to the 
popular conception of the U.N. that had existed prior to his father’s administration, as an 
effete and spineless conglomeration of nations held hostage to the will of the few. 
The criticism was not always explicit.  Instead, it often functioned as an implicit 
suggestion.  The younger Bush urged the U.N. to act upon its Charter:  “We have called 
on the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm.”  GW 
Bush never mentioned how the U.N would fulfill the Charter, though he was presumably 
referring to Security Council resolution 1441.  This resolution made specific reference to 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that dealt with “Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression.”  However, the invocation of action extended to that 
resolution’s pledge that Iraq “will face serious consequences as a result of its continued 
violations of its obligations” to disarm.32 
Invoking the name of the United Nations also contrasted U.N. efforts to prevent 
the threat of weapons of mass destruction with the presumptive success of other anti-
proliferation endeavors.  These included U.S. support for the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s efforts to “track and control nuclear materials,” U.S. cooperation with 
other countries to “secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union” and similar 
cooperation “to strengthen global treaties banning the production and shipment of missile 
technologies and weapons of mass destruction.” 33  GW Bush contrasted the diplomacy of 
the U.N. with the decisiveness of U.S. action, reassuring his audience that “America’s 
purpose is more than to follow a process—it is to achieve a result:  the end of terrible 
threats to the civilized world.”  To that end, he asked the nations of the world to join the 
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United States in taking action to counter the threat of terrorism, while reassuring the 
American public that such compliance was an unnecessary precursor for action as “the 
course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of other.”34 
 GW Bush suggested contempt for U.N. impotency through a series of parallel 
statements wherein he made the case for disarming Iraq.  The first part of each statement 
noted an occasion in which the U.N. had reached some conclusion regarding Iraqi 
possession of weapons of mass destruction.  The second part noted Hussein’s inaction in 
addressing those conclusions: 
Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave Saddam 
Hussein his final chance to disarm.  He has shown instead utter contempt for the 
United Nations, and for the opinion of the world. . . The United Nations 
concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to 
produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax. . . He’s given no evidence that he has 
destroyed it.  The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials 
sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin—enough to 
subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure.  He hadn’t accounted for 
that material.  He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed it.35 
 
GW Bush followed this evidence with references to U.S. intelligence reports supporting 
the conclusion that Hussein had failed to disarm.  He urged the U.S. to act by asserting 
implicitly that the U.N. has failed to do so. 
 The 2003 State of the Union address concluded with a reference not unlike that in 
Lincoln’s second inaugural address.  As Lincoln’s inaugural address ended, he noted the 
role of the Almighty in providing moral clarity.  Lincoln reflected upon the appeals of 
both Unionists and Confederates to God.  Although he offered his own implicit 
suggestion as to who actually held God’s favor, Lincoln noted that men should not judge 
their enemies, nor should they attempt to discern God’s purposes for the war: 
It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in 
wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces, but let us judge not, that 
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we be not judged.  The prayers of both could not be answered.  That of neither has 
been answered fully.  The Almighty has his own purposes.36 
 
GW Bush called freedom “God’s gift to humanity,” and went on to assert that Americans 
were not solely concerned with their own opinions.  “We Americans have faith in 
ourselves,” he argued, “but not in ourselves alone.”37  Like Lincoln, he reflected on the 
human inability to know the will of God while implicitly asserting that His will clearly 
lies with the United States.  “We do not know,” Lincoln said, “we do not claim to know 
all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving 
God behind all of life, and all of history.”38 
 While GW Bush’s certainty was consistent with the moral strain of American 
exceptionalism that remained a consistent theme in American foreign policy rhetoric, it 
also recalled the vague moral crusades of earlier eras so firmly opposed by realists like 
his father.  In the current president’s discourse, the international community that arose 
from the end of the Cold War became nothing more than a body for Americans to disdain 
for failing to acquiesce to American foreign policy demands. 
 Ironically, the current administration has not embraced the realism of the prior 
administration.  For instance, although one of her mentors was Brent Scowcroft, 
Condeleeza Rice and Scowcroft are not on speaking terms largely related to Scowcroft’s 
realist critcism of U.S. policy in Iraq.39  Instead, idealism has dominated much of the 
public discourse on the war.  This failure to balance that idealism, itself a product of 
American exceptionalism, with the rhetoric of realism has perhaps created a situation 
from which the administration cannot easily extricate itself. 
 Rhetorical critic Gregory Olson has argued that Eisenhower’s rhetorical strategy 
of embracing Diem and only celebrating his foreign policy successes had the unfortunate 
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consequence of locking Eisenhower and future administrations “into a commitment to 
prove the veracity of that rhetoric.”40  The same might be said of any foreign policy that 
embraces the tradition of American exceptionalism without the prudential constraint of 
realism.  While the ideal of a free and stable Iraq may be a noble enterprise, valid or not, 
American expectations have been tempered by the perceived impact of past experiences. 
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